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Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row?
The Harm of Legislative Silence
MARAH STITH MCLEOD*

This Article addresses the substantive question, "Does the death
penalty require death row?" and the procedural question, "Who

"

should decide?

In most capital punishment states, prisoners sentenced to death are
held, because of their sentences alone, in far harsher conditions of

confinement than other prisoners. Often,

this means solitary

confinementfor the years and even decades until their executions.

Despite a growing amount of media attention to the use of solitary
confinement, most scholars and courts have continued to assume that
the isolation of death-sentenced prisoners on death row is an
inevitable administrative aspect of capitalpunishment. To the extent
scholars have written about death row, they have focused on its

harshness. None has objected to the fact that prison administrators
are the ones who have decided to maintain death row in most capital
punishment states.

This Article addresses for the first time the authority of prison
administratorsto establish or retain death row. It begins by exploring
the nature of this death row decision, and concludes that death row is
rationalonly if its intendedpurpose is to punish. This conclusion leads
to the second and more significant claim in the Article: that only
legislatures are competent to require death row. This claim is

grounded in the need for democratic legitimacy and public
deliberation in the imposition of punishment, in the separation of
powers, and in the principle of legality.
Death row should be abolished unless legislatures choose to retain it,

expressly and deliberately,for retributive or deterrent reasons.

* Associate in Law, Columbia Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Harvard
University. For the many insights and conversations that helped to deepen the analysis in
this Article, the author thanks Daniel Richman, Bernard Harcourt, Robert Ferguson, James
Liebman, Richard Brooks, Kent Greenawalt, Philip Hamburger, Henry Monaghan, Jamal
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Leibovich, Mark Cunningham, Andrea Lyon, Josh Kleinfeld, and the participants at the St.
John's University School of Law faculty workshop and the Columbia Law School
Associates' workshop at which earlier drafts of this Article were discussed. For any errors
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OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL

526

[Vol. 77:3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

INTRODUCTION
...................................
......
DEATH Row INAMERICA
.................................

526
535

A. The ProlongationofPre-Execution Confinement ................ 536
B. CurrentDeath Row Conditions ..............
...... 537
C. The Allocation ofDecisionalPower over Death Row..........539
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DEATH Row........
...... 543
A. Is Death Row Necessary to Incapacitatethe Condemned? ..543
B. Is Death Row Necessary to Rehabilitate the Condemned?... 552
C. Is Death Row Necessaryfor Retributive Justice?.................557
D. Is Death Row Necessary to Deter Othersfrom Crime?........563
RE-ALLOCATING DECISIONAL POWER OVER DEATH Row...........566
A. The Legislative Responsibilityfor Just Punishment ............. 567
1. Retributive and DeterrentRationales.........
........ 567
2. Defending LegislativeAction Against Objections .......... 571
a. PrisonMicromanagement..........
........ 571
b. Legislative Harshness ...............
...... 575
B. Executive Officials and Executioner Bias.............578
1. Inmates As Savages
.........................
580
2. The Destruction ofEmpathy
..........................582
3. Deflection ofResponsibility ...................
584
C. The Role of the Courts .
..........................
586
1. SeparationofPowers As a Limit on Death Row ............ 587
2. Ex Post Facto Limitations on Death Row.......................590
CONCLUSION
......................................
..... 592
"Even if the law were to condone or permit this added
punishment, so stark an outcome ought not to be the result of
society's simple unawareness or indiference."I
1. INTRODUCTION

Life on death row has been likened to torture. 2 The European Court of
Human Rights famously refused to allow England to extradite a European
1

Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (objecting
to the use of permanent solitary confinement for death row and certain other prisoners).
2
See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 91 (1989)
(barring extradition to Virginia because "if extradited, [the capital defendant] faces a real
risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment");
INT'L FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH) & CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (CCR),
DISCRIMINATION, TORTURE, AND EXECUTION: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF THE DEATH

PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA AND LOUISIANA 4 (Oct. 2013), http://ccrjustice.org/files/2013-
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citizen to face capital charges in the United States because of the risk that the
person would end up confined on Virginia's death row in inhuman
conditions. 3 In states like Virginia, death-sentenced prisoners are held in
solitary confinement for the years and often decades leading up to their
executions 4 -a condition so severe that, in the words of Justice Anthony
Kennedy in a recent capital case, it may bring prisoners "to the edge of
madness, perhaps to madness itself." 5 Many scholars and judges have attacked
death row as barbaric and cruel; some even have concluded that death row
inmates are being impelled to drop their appeals and "volunteer" for execution
because life on death row is worse than death itself.6 In fact, over ten percent
of the prisoners executed since 1976 have volunteered for execution. 7
(recounting death row
Death-Penalty-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UV7-GXE9]
deprivations and isolation); Angela April Sun, Note, "Killing Time" in the Valley of the
Shadow of Death: Why Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and
Unusual, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1598-99 (2013) (describing life on death row as
psychological torture).
3
Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 191. Recently, the High Court of Ireland refused to
extradite an Irish citizen to face terrorism-related charges in the United States, because he
likely would face solitary confinement in the federal "supermax" prison. See Att'y Gen. v.
Damache [2015] IEHC 339, ¶ 11.11.19 (Ir.) ("[T]he institutionalisation of solitary
confinement ... with its routine isolation from meaningful contact and communication
with staff and other inmates, for a prolonged pre-determined period of at least 18 months
and continuing almost certainly for many years, amounts to a breach of the constitutional
requirement to protect persons from inhuman and degrading treatment and to respect the
dignity of the human being.").
4
See Prieto v. Clarke, No. 1:12-CV- 1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov.
12, 2013), rev'd on other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015) (describing Virginia's
death row policy under which every death-sentenced prisoner is locked alone for twentythree hours a day in a single cell enclosed by walls and a solid metal door to prevent
communication, eats all his meals alone in his cell, has no contact visits with family or
friends, and is denied work and educational opportunities).
5
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2209. If a death-sentenced prisoner is brought to madness,
however, he may not be executed. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986)
("The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a
prisoner who is insane.").
6
See, e.g., Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The issue is
whether [the prisoner's] conditions of confinement constitute punishment so harsh that he
has been forced to abandon a natural desire to live."); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(ACLU), A DEATH BEFORE DYING: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON DEATH Row 8 (July

2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/fielddocument/deathbeforedying-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YBR-7S4Y] ("Facing isolated conditions, helplessness, despair, and the
anxiety and anguish of waiting to die for years on end, many death row prisoners take
control in the only way they know: they drop their legal appeals and 'volunteer' for
execution."); Mona Lynch, Supermax Meets Death Row: Legal Struggles Around the Mew
Punitiveness in the US, in THE NEW PUNITIVENESS: TRENDS, THEORIES, PERSPECTIVES 66,

69 (John Pratt et al. eds., 2005) ("In the case of death row inmates, the decision to give up
appeals and volunteer for execution is potentially the product of .. . suicidal urges brought
on by the living conditions."); Amy Smith, Not "Waiving" but Drowning: The Anatomy of
Death Row Syndrome and Volunteering for Execution, 17 PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 253 (2008)
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If prisoners were executed within weeks or months, as they were two
hundred years ago,8 death row might not warrant such attention. But today,
death-sentenced inmates await execution for an average of fifteen-and-a-half
years9-the amount of time that other prisoners are confined as punishment for
serious felonies.10 Of the approximately 3,000 prisoners on death row today,
more are likely to die of natural causes than to be executed.'I Execution delays
(explaining that "if the experience of living on death row creates some discernable [sic]

pattern of psychological responses, volunteering for execution is likely only one of many
possible outcomes").
7

See CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC.,

DEATH Row U.S.A. 6 (Spring 2015), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
DRUSASpring2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G597-6DG9] (reporting 1404 executions since
1976); Information on Defendants Who Were Executed Since 1976 and Designated as

"Volunteers," DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.deathpenalty

info.org/information-defendants-who-were-executed-1976-and-designated-volunteers

[https://

perma.cc/G35G-49EE] [hereinafter DPIC "Volunteers'] (listing 141 "volunteers" executed
since 1976).
8
Even as late as 1960, prisoners sentenced to death could expect execution within an
average of two years. See Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death
Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L.

REV. 147, 181 (1998); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764-65 (2015) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
9

-

TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013
STATISTICAL TABLES 14 tbl. 10 (Dec. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdfcp 3st.pdf

[https://perma.cc/K4YZ-2TYX]. The most recent average recorded by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics is nine years more than it was three decades ago. See id (reporting that

the average number of months from sentencing to execution was 74 in 1984, 122 in 1994,
132 in 2004, and 186 in 2013). Records from the Death Penalty Information Center reveal
that the average time from sentence to execution for prisoners executed in 2014 was nearly
eighteen years. See Execution List 2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2014 [https://perma.cc/D7X7-JV43].
10

Cf ROBERT M. BOHM, DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 199 (4th ed. 2012) ("[B]ecause

of super due process protections, capital offenders typically serve more than 20 percent of
what otherwise might be a 50-year LWOP sentence before they are executed.").
11
See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF ABOLITION 11 (2010) (describing "natural causes" as the primary cause of death on
death row); Ernest van den Haag, Commentary, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99
HARV. L. REv. 1662, 1662 (1986) (explaining that "most convicts sentenced to death are
likely to die of old age"). Execution is now unlikely for persons sentenced to death. Of the
8,466 defendants sentenced to death from 1973 to 2013, only 1,359 were executed. SNELL,
supra note 9, at 19 tbl.16. Five hundred and nine died of other causes while still on death
row. Id And 3,586 were ultimately removed from death row due to court decisions or
commutations. Id Thus, most death-sentenced inmates can expect to spend years and even
decades on death row, with a far greater likelihood that they will die on death row or be
spared a death sentence than that they will be executed. See also James S. Liebman & Peter
Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority's Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHiO ST. J.
CRUM. L. 255, 319 (2011) (arguing that the real penalty is "life without the possibility of

parole, but with a small chance of execution a decade [or more] later" (emphasis omitted));
Samuel R. Gross, Barbara O'Brien, Chen Hu & Edward H. Kennedy, Rate of False
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have transformed the death penalty from relatively prompt execution into a de
jure sentence of death and a de facto sentence of something close to life in
prison.1 2 The segregation and isolation of living on death row compounds the
suffering imposed on these prisoners by their long de facto term of
incarceration. The unique harms caused by solitary confinement recently have
become the focus of intensive study and media attention, with calls to end the
use of solitary confinement based on its debilitating psychological effects.13

Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
Sci. 7230, 7230 (2014) (noting "most death-sentenced defendants are removed from death
row").
12
1n 2014, a district judge held that in California a death sentence had become not
death but "life in prison with the remote possibility of death," and found this penalty
unconstitutional. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (emphasis
omitted) ("[Flor most [prisoners], systemic delay has made their execution so unlikely that
the death sentence carefully and deliberately imposed by the jury has been quietly
transformed into one no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life in prison, with
the remote possibility of death. As for the random few for whom execution does become a
reality, they will have languished for so long on Death Row that their execution will serve
no retributive or deterrent purpose and will be arbitrary." (emphasis omitted)), rev'd sub
nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015); see also id ("California juries have
imposed the death sentence on more than 900 individuals since 1978. Yet only 13 of those
900 have been executed by the State. Of the remainder, 94 have died of causes other than
execution by the State, 39 were granted relief from their death sentence by the federal
courts and have not been resentenced to death, and 748 are currently on Death Row, having
their death sentence evaluated by the courts or awaiting their execution." (footnote
omitted)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the district court's decision
in Jones, on the ground that it depended on a "new" constitutional rule of criminal
procedure that the federal court lacked authority to apply on collateral review. See Jones v.
Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 552 (9th Cir. 2015).
13
See, e.g., THE LIMAN PROGRAM, YALE LAW SCH. & Ass'N OF STATE CORR.
ADM'RS, TIME-IN-CELL: THE ASCA-LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE

SEGREGATION IN PRISON 59 (Aug. 2015) [hereinafter ASCA-LIMAN SURVEY],
https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/asca-liman-administrative-segregation
report sep_22015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6RV-E2JP];
Erica
Goode,
Solitary
Confinement: Punished for Life, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/04/health/solitary-confinement-mental-illness.html [https://perma.cc/SRX7-C55K];
Editorial, Solitary Confinement Is Cruel and All Too Common, N.Y TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/opinion/solitary-confinement-is-cruel-common-anduseless.html [https://perma.cc/L6W8-X5N3]; Paige St. John, California Agrees to Move
Thousands of Inmates Out of Solitary Confinement, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-califomia-will-move-thousands-of-inmatesout-of-solitary-20150901-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZPT4-V2U3]; Timothy Williams,
Prison Officials Join Movement to Curb Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/us/prison-directors-group-calls-for-limiting-solitaryconfinement.html [https://perma.cc/ZW9Y-5ZYK].
This Article will focus primarily on the solitary confinement of death-sentenced
prisoners, because such isolation is experienced by so many death row prisoners and is the
type of confinement that most starkly contrasts with the treatment of noncapital prisoners.
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Yet death row, and the isolation it typically entails, 14 often is treated as an
inevitable administrative aspect of a death sentence. To the extent that scholars
and courts have focused on death row, they have objected primarily to the
degree of its harshness and its crippling psychological effects.' 5 None has
challenged the fact that prison administrators are the ones that have chosen to
establish death row, without any legislative mandate.1 6 Just recently, the
Fourth Circuit held in a Virginia case that "tethered to the death sentence in
Virginia is pre-execution confinement on death row."i 7 The court stated that,
"Virginia law mandates that all persons convicted of capital crimes are, upon
receipt of a death sentence, automatically confined to death row . . . because of
the crime they have committed and the sentence they have received." 18 In fact,
although death-sentenced prisoners in Virginia and elsewhere are sent
The arguments in the Article would also apply, however, to less harsh conditions of death
row confinement.
14 A survey conducted by the Association of State Correctional Administrators
(ASCA) confirmed the widespread existence of death row and the severe restrictions on
death row inmates. See ASCA SURVEY: INMATES SENTENCED TO DEATH HOUSING POLICY

&

1-8 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY], http://www.asca.net/
system/assets/attachments/5520/WA%20-%2ODeath%2OPenalty%20Housing.pdf?l 362689
706 [https://perma.cc/TDE4-338B]. As scholars and courts have recognized, death row
conditions may be significantly more severe than prison conditions for noncapital inmates,
and may involve solitary confinement as well as segregation. See, e.g., Prieto v. Clarke,
No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013) ("Conditions on
death row are more restrictive than incarceration in the general population housing units at
[Virginia's Sussex I State Prison], which is a maximum-security facility. The former
amount to a form of solitary confinement: On average, plaintiff must remain in his single
cell for all but one hour of the day."), rev'd on other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir.
2015); Elizabeth Compa, Cecelia Trenticosta Kappel & Mercedes Montagnes, Litigating
Civil Rights on Death Row: A Louisiana Perspective, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 293, 313
(2014) ("The disparity between conditions on death row and other parts of the prison in
Virginia is not unusual.").
After a death warrant has been issued and execution is imminent, special conditions of
confinement may be imposed. See e.g., 61 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4303 (West
2010) (mandating solitary confinement with no visitors except by court order other than
prison staff, lawyer, and spiritual advisor). This Article does not include such post-warrant
confinement within its description of "death row."
15 See supranotes 2-6 and accompanying text.
16
Some scholars have argued for amelioration or elimination of death row, but have
argued that prison administrators should make this change. See e.g., Robert Johnson
John L. Carroll, Litigating Death-Row Conditions: The Case for Reform, in PRISONERS
AND THE LAw 8-3, 8-22 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 2015) (stating that it would "be ideal if more
correctional administrators would voluntarily and spontaneously adopt a humane approach
to death-row confinement"); Andrea D. Lyon & Mark D. Cunningham, "Reason Not the
Need": Does the Lack of Compelling State Interest in Maintaininga Separate Death Row
Make It Unlawful?, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2-4 (2005) (arguing that prison administrators
should not continue to automatically and permanently isolate prisoners on death row
because security does not require it).
17 Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 254 (4th Cir. 2015).
18 Id
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automatically and permanently to death row, few jurisdictions require death
row by statutory law. In Virginia, and in most states, 19 death row is imposed
only as a prison policy. In the words of capital punishment scholar David
Garland, death row is "an administrative arrangement with no specific legal
authority." 20
This Article addresses for the first time the authority of prison
administrators to establish death row. The analysis begins with a consideration
of the nature of the decision to establish death row, and concludes--contrary
to prevailing assumptions-that death row cannot be justified for
administrative reasons. Instead, it may be justified only based on a punishment
rationale. This conclusion leads to the second and more significant conclusion
in the Article, which is that legislatures alone are competent to require death
row.
To understand the nature of the death row decision, the Article asks what
possible purposes such confinement may serve, focusing on the traditional
aims of incapacitation, rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence. The first of
these, incapacitation, closely tracks the primary administrative rationale for
death row, which is prison security.
Mounting evidence has undermined the claim that death row is needed for
prison security. The most powerful evidence comes from Missouri, which
eliminated death row over twenty years ago. 2 1 After Missouri abolished death
row, and began to evaluate its death-sentenced prisoners individually to
determine their proper custody level, it discovered that the vast majority of
them did not require isolation. 22 And a follow-up study showed that after
19The Fourth Circuit stated that "Virginia law" requires death row for any deathsentenced prisoner. Id But the "law" the court was referring to is only the policy of the
Virginia Department of Corrections, a policy that Virginia capital punishment statutes do
not require and which the department may change if it wishes. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.132.1 (2013) (providing that the Director of Corrections shall establish a system of prisoner
evaluation and classification, with no mention of rules for death-sentenced prisoners).
Equating statutory law and prison policy in this context perpetuates the mistaken view that
death row is an inevitable aspect of a death sentence. Even if policies have a binding effect
on the state, they should be distinguished from statutory laws. Cf, e.g., Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (stating that liberty interests may arise under "state laws
or policies"). Indeed, such a distinction will be important because statutory law may be
used for purposes that prison policy may not (such as to establish punishment for prisoners'
original crimes).
20
GARLAND, supra note 11, at 46. Garland did not explore or discuss whether prison
administrators' role in establishing death row is acceptable as a normative or legal matter.
21 Litigation over Missouri's death row conditions-which were far worse than
conditions in the general prison population-led a federal court to order their amelioration
by consent decree. Missouri's prison administrators instead chose to eliminate death row
and to confine the death-sentenced prisoners like noncapital prisoners. See infra note 75
and accompanying text.
22
Eighty-four percent of death-sentenced prisoners in Missouri's prison system ended
up in general population housing, with twenty-one percent housed in the "honor dorm" for
the best-behaved inmates. Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy & Jon R. Sorensen, Is
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elimination of death row in Missouri, the death-sentenced inmates committed
less violent misconduct than prisoners in the same institution who had been
sentenced to lesser terms. 23 Missouri's experience-and other studies of prison
violence 24-reveals that the automatic and permanent isolation on death row
of all death-sentenced prisoners leads to substantial needless suffering for
many prisoners. 2 5
The lack of an adequate security rationale for isolating all death-sentenced
prisoners does not mean that death row cannot be justified, however. The
Article next considers whether death row may serve the purposes of
rehabilitation, retribution, or deterrence. It concludes that retribution and
Death Row Obsolete? A Decade of MainstreamingDeath-SentencedInmates in Missouri,
23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 307, 316 (2005). Another six percent of death-sentenced prisoners
were placed in special protective custody, not based on claims that they posed special risks
to others but based on a determination that these death-sentenced prisoners themselves
were likely to be victimized. Id.
23 "Violent misconduct was considered to include murder/manslaughter, attempted
murder/manslaughter, forcible sexual assault, major assault, and minor assault." Id at 313.
Prisoners sentenced to death, life without parole, and terms allowing for parole were
considered separately. Id at 312. The study found that death-sentenced inmates were
60.6% as likely to engage in violent misconduct as parole-eligible prisoners (and lifewithout-parole prisoners were only 50% as likely). Id at 315. Death-sentenced inmates had
a 0% rate of committing murders, manslaughters, or attempted murders per year, while
life-without-parole inmates had a 0.42% rate and parole-eligible inmates had a 0.23% rate.
Id at24314.
See infra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
25Two scholars have called for the abolition of death row in light of the Missouri
study. Mark Cunningham penned an article with law professor and law school dean Andrea
Lyon arguing that "[i]f death-sentenced inmates represent a more, rather than less,
manageable group of maximum security prisoners, then there is no apparent remaining
legitimate penological justification for their confinement as a class in arduous death row
conditions." Lyon & Cunningham, supranote 16, at 4. Lyon and Cunningham attacked the
"draconian" conditions of death row as based not on sound penal policy but what they
consider to be a false "mythology" that death-sentenced prisoners are depraved and
malevolent. Id at 2.
Insofar as this Article also contends that a security rationale does not justify death
row, it aligns with much of what Lyon and Cunningham argue in greater detail in their
article. But the analysis here differs in substantial ways from Lyon and Cunningham's
claims. Lyon and Cunningham conclude that death row may violate the Eighth
Amendment when it involves severe forms of isolation, because such isolation is
unnecessary for security. See id at 13; see also infra note 279 (discussing Lyon and
Cunningham's Eighth Amendment argument). But they fail to consider whether death row
isolation serves other legitimate purposes such as retribution or deterrence. This Article
shows that these other aims of punishment offer plausible reasons--the only plausible
reasons-for retaining death row. This leads to a second and more significant conclusion
overlooked by scholars and death row litigants to date: that prison administrators lack the
institutional competence to establish death row, because they lack the proper authority to
prescribe punishment. The Article reveals that death row imposed by administrative
command-as it is in most states today-should be declared invalid on structural
constitutional grounds.

2016]
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deterrence are plausible reasons for retaining death row. An advocate of
retributive justice might contend that prisoners who have committed the worst
crimes should be held in conditions that reflect the gravity of their offenses. 2 6
Pursuit of deterrence might lead others to support death row in the hope that
prospective capital murderers would fear the certainty of cruel death row
conditions, even if they might discount the possibility of execution long in the
future. The point here is not that death row ought to be retained for these
reasons, but only that these punishment purposes offer conceivable reasons
why some might want to preserve it.
Once one recognizes that death row might be retained for punishment
reasons, the inquiry must turn to who should decide. Only legislatures are
suited to decide whether to retain death row, for at least three reasons. First,
legislatures have the greatest claim to democratic legitimacy in answering
moral questions that do not admit of any empirically correct answer-such as
the proper quantum of retributive punishment or whether to pursue retribution
or deterrence in the first place. Second, the separation of powers grants
legislatures alone the power to prescribe punishment. 27 Third, prior statutory
authorization of punishment is needed to satisfy the principle of legality. Each
of these three considerations demands express legislative imprimatur before
death row may be retained.
Legislatures, moreover, may not be allowed simply to delegate the power
to establish death row to prison administrators. In many states, the power to
impose punishment is nondelegable under the constitutional separation of
powers. 2 8 And even in those states in which such delegation might be
permitted, the Article contends, it would be unwise to entrust the death row
decision to prison administrators. For prison administrators may choose to
retain death row simply because such restrictive custody makes it
psychologically easier for them to command and oversee the execution
process, and not for legitimate purposes.
The foregoing arguments present a substantial challenge to the death row
status quo. Courts should be prepared to hold existing death row policies ultra
vires and void, at least in those states that retain a strict separation of powers.
Legislatures then may choose whether to enact statutes to preserve death row.
Some may decide not to reinstate death row, perhaps because of its cruelty or
its expense. Others may decide to authorize sentencing authorities to impose
death row only in certain severe cases or only for a limited time. Some will do
nothing due to legislative gridlock. All of these results would be permissible,
and preferable, to the status quo of illegitimate administrative action.

26

See ROBERT BLECKER, THE DEATH OF PUNISHMENT: SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE
AMONG THE WORST OF THE WORST 279, 282 (2013) (arguing for harsher prison conditions
for death row prisoners to reflect the greater severity of their crimes).
27 Several state courts have held that this power to punish may not be delegated to
executive
branch officials. See infra notes 205, 212 and accompanying text.
28
See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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Some may object to this argument for legislative choice. Two main
objections seem most likely. One goes to the breadth of the argument: Will
legislatures be expected to micromanage all other decisions by prison
administrators? This objection would reflect a legitimate reluctance to intrude
upon prison decisions based on administrators' experience and expertise. But
death row placement differs in important ways from most or all decisions
made by prison administrators. Three features typically set death row apart: its
permanence, its categorical imposition, and its severity. These three
characteristics reveal why death row is not a choice properly made by prison
administrators, why we should care, and why reallocating power over death
row to legislatures would not lead to micromanagement of the array of routine
prison rules.
The other likely objection goes to the consequences of an argument for
legislative choice: Would not lawmakers be even less humane than prison
administrators? William Stuntz famously explored the pathological politics of
criminal law and the tendency of politicians to impose ever harsher penalties
in order to appear tough on crime. 29 This objection, however, overlooks the
importance of public deliberation and democratic legitimacy in the
prescription of punishment, limitations imposed by the separation of powers,
and the principle of legality's requirement of statutory authorization when
punishment is prescribed. 30 These crucial considerations do not depend on the
consequences of legislative choice.
The consequentialist critique also may be wrong on its own terms. More
democratic decisions regarding death row might not lead to greater
inhumanity. Historically, legislatures have adopted more humane methods of
execution, for example. 3 ' It would be hard to imagine legislatures being
significantly harsher regarding death row than prison administrators have been
to date. And even if some politicians would ignore humanitarian concerns,
29

William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REV.

505, 528
(2001).
30

Considerations of legitimacy and legality are closely linked. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights applied this understanding, for example, in a requested advisory
opinion regarding what "law" might permissibly impose restrictions on human rights under
the American Convention on Human Rights. See The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) No. 6, 1 37 (May 9, 1986). The court explained that,
[F]or purposes of interpretation of [the relevant article of the Convention], the
concepts of legality and legitimacy coincide, inasmuch as only a law that has been
passed by democratically elected and constitutionally legitimate bodies and is tied to
the general welfare may restrict the enjoyment or exercise of the rights or freedoms of
the individual.
Id

31 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731-32 (2015) (recounting legislative
efforts to find "the most humane" manner of executing death-sentenced prisoners (quoting
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890))).
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they might agree to abolish death row for fiscal reasons, because custody
restrictions (particularly solitary confinement) impose high costs. 32 Death row
housing has been estimated to cost nearly $100,000 more per prisoner per
year. 33 Thus, legislatures might abolish death row for many reasons, financial
as well as humanitarian.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides background on
development of death row in America today and how it has been established
primarily through administrative policy. Part III explores the nature of the
death row decision and asks whether death row is necessary for incapacitation,
rehabilitation, retribution, or deterrence. 34 The Article concludes that only
retribution and deterrence are plausible reasons for retaining death row. Part
IV contends that because only punishment purposes possibly can justify death
row, legislatures have the sole legal and democratic authority to establish or
retain it. This Part further explains why legislatures ought not to delegate the
power to establish death row to prison administrators, even if such delegation
were permitted under law, because of the risk that prison administrators would
retain death row for illegitimate reasons. Finally, this Part explains how courts
can help ensure proper allocation of power over death row and prevent prison
administrators and legislatures from exceeding their respective authorities.
The Article answers the substantive question of whether the death penalty
requires death row, and the procedural question of who should decide. It
reveals that death row is unnecessary for administrative reasons and can be
justified only for punishment purposes. Accordingly, it concludes, death row
should be abolished unless it is required by express statutory command.
II. DEATH Row IN AMERICA

This Part offers a descriptive account of death row in the United States
today. The first Section describes three important features of death row: first,
the dramatic increase in the duration of death row confinement over the last
32

See

ACLU,

PAYING

THE

PRICE

FOR

SOLITARY

CONFINEMENT

(2015),

https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/publications/paying-price-solitary-confinement-aclufactsheet-2015/ [https://perma.cc/U55Q-AHWS];

BOHM, supra note 10, at 183-84

(recounting studies of high costs of death row confinement); Lyon & Cunningham, supra
note 16, at 26-27 (summarizing fiscal costs of death row in several states).
33

See Arthur L. Alarc6n & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A
Roadmap to Mend or End the CaliforniaLegislature'sMulti-Billion-DollarDeath Penalty
Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REv. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S41, S104 (2011).
34

See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW

§ 2.03

(2d ed. 1995); see

also Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of
Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1990) ("Retribution, deterrence
(general and specific), rehabilitation, and incapacitation represent overlapping and
antithetical perspectives on why, when, and to what degree criminals should undergo pain
and suffering through punishment."). The Article focuses on general deterrence, because of
the limited relevance of specific deterrence in the death row context, see infra notes 11 5,
183.
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two centuries; second, the ways in which death row entails different and worse
treatment of death-sentenced inmates; and third, the ways in which state
statutes and administrative policies determine the conditions of death row
confinement.
A. The ProlongationofPre-Execution Confinement
Prisoners condemned to death in colonial days would spend days or weeks
waiting for their executions. 3 5 State statutes in the late 1800s usually required
executions to be scheduled within weeks or months after sentencing. 36 Until
fairly recently, executions followed sentencing in relatively short order.
Garland writes that "[b]efore the 1960s, the average time that American
inmates spent awaiting execution was . . . measured in weeks and months

rather than in years and decades." 3 7 In 1960, the average time from sentencing
to execution was two years. 38 Today, many prisoners spend decades on death
row. The average time between sentencing and execution is fifteen-and-a-half
years. 39
Pre-execution delays dramatically increase the relevance of death row for
capital punishment. Some scholars and judges doubt that execution delays can
be eliminated in light of prisoners' expanding rights to constitutional review of
their death sentences. 40 History supports that claim; both federal and state
efforts to reduce pre-execution delays have failed. Congress enacted the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 4 1 to speed up
the execution process and limit federal court review of state death sentences. 42
In the year before AEDPA, the average time between sentencing and
execution was just over eleven years. 43 Two decades later, it is more than four
35

STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 17 (2002); BOHM,

supra note 10, at 2.
36
See, e.g., McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 157-58 (1891) (requiring an execution
date within four to eight weeks); Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 487 (1890)
(discussing a Minnesota statute prescribing confinement "for a period of not less than one
month nor more than six months"); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 163-64 (1890) (discussing
a Colorado statute requiring an execution date within two to four weeks).
37
GARLAND, supra note 11, at 46.
38
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
Aarons, supra note 8, at 181).
39

SNELL, supra note 9, at 14 tbl. 10.

40

Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Consistency
would seem to demand that those who accept our death penalty jurisprudence as a given
also accept the lengthy delay between sentencing and execution as a necessary
consequence.").
41 In relevant part, AEDPA has been codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d) & 2254 (2012).
42
See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (noting "AEDPA's purpose to
further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism" (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 420, 436 (2000))).
43

TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1995, at 11 tbl.11

(Dec. 1996), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp95.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2FQ-XS47].
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years longer.44 State attempts to limit execution delays have been similarly
unavailing. Florida, for example, codified the following provision shortly after
Congress enacted AEDPA: "It is the intent of the Legislature to reduce delays
in capital cases and to ensure that all appeals and postconviction actions in
capital cases are resolved within 5 years after the date a sentence of death is
imposed in the circuit court." 4 5 Yet the ten persons Florida executed in the last
two years had spent an average of over twenty years on death row; 4 6 none of
them had spent less than fifteen years between sentencing and execution. 47
Even if the time from sentencing to execution decreases in the future, most
prisoners sentenced to death likely will continue to spend many years on death
row.
B. CurrentDeath Row Conditions
Death row involves the segregation of death-sentenced inmates and their
placement in "a separate enclosure" away from other inmates. 4 8 Today, almost
all of the thirty-one capital punishment states 49 (as well as the federal
government and the military5 0 ) segregate their death-sentenced inmates.5 1 In
4 SNELL, supra note 9, at 14 tbl. 10.
45
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.055 (West Supp. 2016).
46

Execution List: 1976-present, FLA. DEP'T CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/

deathrow/execlist.html [https://perma.cc/22Q3-6Y8W] [hereinafter FLA. Execution List].
Florida states that since 1979, the average age at time of offense has been 29.78 years, and
the average age at time of execution has been 46.56 years, making the average time on
death row since 1979 approximately 16.5 years. Institutions: Death Row, FLA. DEP'T OF
CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/ [https:/perma.cc/R5EC-Z5KF] [hereinafter
FLA. Death Row].
47

FLA. Execution List, supra note 46 (listing dates of sentencings and executions, the
shortest time between which was for Juan Carlos Chavez, who was sentenced on
November 23, 1998, and executed on February 12, 2014).
48
GARLAND, supra note 11, at 46.
49
Thirty-one states have crimes punishable by death. Nebraska was the thirty-second
until recently. See L.B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2015) (repealing the death penalty
over the Governor's veto on May 27, 2015). One additional state (New Mexico) repealed
its death penalty but only prospectively, leaving inmates on death row. See Death Row
Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-rowinmates-state-and-size-death-row-year?scid=9&did=188#state [https://perma.ccTN62-8K8N].
Connecticut also abolished its death penalty only prospectively, but its partial retention of
the penalty recently was found unconstitutional. See State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 11
(Conn. 2015).
50The federal government houses sixty-two prisoners on death row at the U.S.
Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, which was created in 1995 as the first national death
row facility in American history. See BOHM, supra note 10, at 105 (describing facility);
Federal Death Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/federal-death-row-prisoners [https://perma.cc/JY7R-G6AU] (last updated June 26,
2015). The military has six prisoners on death row, which is a "secluded corridor" in the
U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (the Department of Defense's
only maximum security facility). See ARMY NEWS SERV., Doing Time at Leavenworth,
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those jurisdictions, death-sentenced inmates are housed in a unit or tier away
from noncapital prisoners, though in some states they may be housed with
temporarily segregated noncapital inmates also removed from the general
prison population. 52
Death row involves more than segregation, however. Most states impose
restrictions on death-sentenced inmates that isolate them from human
interactions. These restrictions come in different forms, such as isolation in a
single-person cell, confinement in cells sealed with solid walls and doors to
prevent communication, isolation during meals (taken alone in the cell),
isolation during exercise (in a single-person pen), denial of work opportunities
and group programs, denial of group religious services, and visitation
restrictions including the prohibition of contact visits with family and friends.
A recent investigation revealed that "[m]ost death row prisoners ... are locked
alone in small cells for 22 to 24 hours a day with little human contact or
interaction; reduced or no natural light; and severe constraints on visitation,
including the inability to ever touch friends or loved ones." 53
Isolation and denial of privileges have been common features of death row
for many years. 54 Indeed, several Supreme Court cases show that states started
ABOUT.COM (Dec. 16, 2014), http://usmilitary.about.com/od/justicelawlegislation/al
leavenworth.htm [https://perma.cc/469Q-V3ZR] (stating that six inmates are "currently on
death row"); Russell Goldman, Fort Hood Shooter Could Join 5 Others on Death Row,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/militarys-death-row/story?id=
9075282 [https://perma.cc/ZM7B-TMXL].
The remainder of this Article will focus on death row practices in the several states,
because virtually all of the scholarship and empirical studies regarding death row with
which this Article engages focus on the states.
51 See ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14 (providing information on the
segregation of inmates).
52
In Idaho, prison policies categorize death-sentenced inmates differently from other
offenders; death-sentenced inmates are evaluated and placed in one of two kinds of
restrictive housing: either administrative segregation or "close-restricted custody general
population." Div. OF PRISONS, IDAHO DEP'T OF CORR., DIRECTIVE NO. 319.02.01.002 v3.0:

OFFENDERS UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH 07.00.00 (2016), https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/
content/policy/904 [https://perma.cc/R8EJ-7MTK]. In Kansas, death-sentenced inmates are
separated from the general prison population and housed in administrative segregation with
other segregated inmates. See Cheryl Cadue, Capital Punishment Information, KAN.
DEP'T OF CORR., http://www.doc.ks.gov/newsroom/capital/data [https://perma.cc/ZZ4TS435] (last modified Jan. 21, 2016). Colorado and South Dakota at times may hold deathsentenced prisoners in segregation along with other prisoners who have been removed
temporarily from the general population. In Colorado and South Dakota, death-sentenced
inmates may be held with other inmates in administrative segregation. See ASCA HOUSING
POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 2, 6.
53
ACLU, supranote 6, at 2; see also ASCA-LIMAN SURVEY, supra note 13, at 43-47;
Sandra Babcock, Death Row Conditions: State by State Comparison, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row [https://perma.cc/6MDS-KAW4]
(follow "Death Row Conditions" hyperlink to download spreadsheet).
54
Although death row segregation and isolation thus are common features of capital
punishment in America, changing penal perspectives are leading to some reductions in the
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55
imposing solitary confinement on death-sentenced inmates in the late 1800s.
By the late 1900s, isolation of death-sentenced prisoners had become the
norm. Scholars reported in 1997 that "while there is some variability in policy
from state to state, death row conditions nationally are characterized by 'rigid
security, isolation, limited movement, and austere conditions.' 56 They noted
that "in 35 jurisdictions death row inmates [we]re housed in individual cells.
In 18 jurisdictions these death row inmates average[d] less than an hour daily
of activity outside of their cells, and in five other jurisdictions out-of-cell time
[wa]s less than three hours daily. Social visitation [wa]s non-contact in 21 of
37 jurisdictions." 57
Criminologist Robert Johnson has written that because death rows are
"maintained in the same way that they were when the stay on death row prior
to execution was minimal, ... [w]hat formerly was a brief but debilitating
experience has . . . become a seemingly endless and agonizing one." 58

C. The Allocation ofDecisionalPower over Death Row
Death row has become an entrenched aspect of capital punishment that
greatly augments the punishment for capital crimes. Yet in most states, death
row is not mentioned in capital punishment statutes. Most legislatures have
remained silent about the practice. Instead, death row has been created by
prison authorities as a matter of prison policy. In his book on capital

use of solitary confinement, including for death-sentenced inmates. Prison administrators
in some states have decided no longer to impose automatic solitary confinement, but
instead to grant death-sentenced inmates certain privileges and incentives for good
behavior. See Brief of Amici Curiae Correctional Experts in Support of Appellee at 26-27,
Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-8021). These changes have taken
place on the prison policy level, in states where statutes do not mandate stricter treatment
of the condemned. Id (citing California's two-tier classification system for death row
inmates, which was adopted pursuant to a 1990 consent order; decisions by North Carolina
and Colorado prison officials not to impose automatic solitary confinement on deathsentenced inmates; and a Pennsylvania prison policy allowing prisoners to have daily time
for out-of-cell activities). Interestingly, even in those states that have lifted the harsh rule of
solitary confinement, death-sentenced inmates usually continue to be segregated from other
prisoners. See ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14. This segregation preserves
the existence of death row.
55
McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483
(1890); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
56Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics,
Adjustment, and Confinement: A Critical Review of the Literature, 20 BEHAv. ScL. & L.
191, 204 (2002) (quoting George Lombardi, Richard D. Sluder & Donald Wallace,
Mainstreaming Death-Sentenced Inmates: The Missouri Experience and Its Legal
Significance, 61 FED. PROB. 3,3 (1997)).
57

58

Id

Johnson & Carroll, supranote 16, at 8-3.
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punishment, Garland writes that death row is "an administrative arrangement
with no specific legal authority." 59
Only a small number of states have statutes that require death row.
Research for this Article has revealed four states-South Dakota,6 0 Texas, 6 1
Washington, 62 and California 63-that prescribe by statute the segregation of
death-sentenced inmates and thus require the creation of death row.
Some other states have legislated restrictions for death-sentenced inmates,
but have not required the creation of death row. Louisiana, for example,
mandates that death-sentenced inmates be held "in a manner affording
maximum protection to the general public, the employees of the department,
and the security of the institution."M Indiana and Mississippi statutes require
death-sentenced inmates to be housed in maximum security facilities. 65
Wyoming requires death-sentenced inmates to be held in solitary

59

60

GARLAND, supra note 11, at 46.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-31.1 (Supp. 2015) ("From the time of delivery to

the penitentiary until the infliction of the punishment of death upon the defendant, unless
lawfully discharged from such imprisonment, the defendant shall be segregated from other
inmates at the penitentiary. No other person may be allowed access to the defendant
without an order of the trial court except penitentiary staff, Department of Corrections
staff, the defendant's counsel, members of the clergy if requested by the defendant, and
members of the defendant's family. Members of the clergy and members of the defendant's
family are subject to approval by the warden before being allowed access to the
defendant.").

61 TEx. Gov'T CODE § 501.113(b) (West 2012) (requiring single occupancy cells for
"inmates confined in death row segregation," as well as other inmates, including those
confined in administrative segregation). This provision was enacted as part of a bill
"relating to the manner in which maximum [prison] capacity is established or increased."
H.B. 124, 72d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1991). Accordingly, Texas death row prisoners are
housed "separately in single-person cells, with each cell having a window. Death row
offenders are also recreated individually. .. . Offenders on death row do not have regular
TDCJ-ID numbers, but have special death row numbers." Death Row Facts, TEx. DEP'T OF
CRIM. JUST.. htto://tdci.state.tx.us/death row/dr facts.html [httDs://Derma.cc/7FE8-2VRA].
62
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.170 (West 2012) (requiring an inmate sentenced to
death to "be confined in the segregation unit, where the defendant may be confined with
other prisoners not under sentence of death, but prisoners under sentence of death shall be
assigned to single-person cells").
63
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3600(d) (West 2011) (establishing a separate classification
system for death-sentenced inmates and referring to "condemned row [at] San Quentin
State Prison").
64
See, e.g., Compa, Kappel & Montagnes, supra note 14, at 313-14 (quoting LA.
REV. STAT. § 15:568 (2013)) (describing how Louisiana prison officials have created a
segregated death row with restrictions as severe as the conditions for inmates who are in
disciplinary detention with extended lockdown).
65
See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-4(a) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-55(1)
(West 2006); see also Death Penalty, IND. DEP'T CORR., http://www.in.gov/idoc/
3349.htm [https://perma.cc/ZK7A-HP7W] (last updated Jan. 16, 2014) ("All offenders on
Death Row are classified as maximum security and housed in single cells.").
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confinement. 66 And Delaware limits visitors to inmates in maximum security,
including death-sentenced inmates.6 7 Statutes in these states do not require
death row, but they also do not forbid prison administrators from establishing
it. And prison administrators in Wyoming, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi,
and Delaware all have chosen, then, to create death row. 6 8
Similarly, in the remaining states (for which research has revealed no
statute imposing special restrictions for death-sentenced prisoners 69) death row
has been established by prison administrators. These states include Virginia, in
which all death-sentenced inmates are held in segregation and solitary
confinement under prison operating procedures. 70 (The Fourth Circuit recently
66

WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-907(a) (2015) ("The administrator of the state penal
institution shall keep a person sentenced to death in solitary confinement until execution of
the death penalty, except the following persons shall be allowed reasonable access to the
prisoner: (i) The prisoner's physician and lawyers; (ii) Relatives and spiritual advisers of
the prisoner; and (iii) Persons involved in examining a prisoner believed to be pregnant or
mentally unfit to proceed with the execution of the sentence.").
67
Deaih Row, DEL. DEP'T CORR., http://www.doc.delaware.gov/deathrow/
factsheet.shtml [https://perma.cc/K9GM-74PC] ("Inmates in maximum security including
those sentenced to the death penalty are reviewed individually for their privilege levels
[with up to two visits per month].").
68
ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 2-4, 8. Death row inmates are
segregated on different tiers so that they never come in physical contact with noncapital
inmates and engage in no activities with one another except mental health group sessions.
Id. at 12.
This Article refers to any separate location-whether a unit, tier, or other subsection
of a prison designed to house more than one inmate-as a form of segregation from other
inmates if death-sentenced inmates are housed there in a way that prevents them from
intermingling with other prisoners. Thus, a prison may have an administrative segregation
unit housing both death-sentenced inmates as well as noncapital inmates, but the deathsentenced inmates are "segregated" if they live in a different area of the unit from
noncapital prisoners. This is a practice in some states. See id
69 This Article does not address the special measures that are used for a limited, final
time to prepare prisoners and prison authorities for the execution procedure after a warrant
for execution has issued. See supra note 14.
70

See VA. DEP'T OF

CORR., OPERATING

PROCEDURE

830.2(IV)(D)(7)

(2015)

[hereinafter VA. OPERATING PROCEDURE], http://vadoc.virginia.gov/About/procedures/
documents/800/830-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T86T-HSJZ] ("Any offender sentenced to
Death will be assigned directly to Death Row. . . ."). Prison administrators cite two
statutes for assigning prisoners directly to death row. Neither of these statutes mentions
death sentences or whether death-sentenced prisoners should be treated differently from
other prisoners. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-10 (2013) (granting authority to the Director of
Corrections); id § 53.1-32.1(A) (requiring that the Director maintain a system of
classification that "(i) evaluates all prisoners according to background, aptitude, education,
and risk and (ii) based on an assessment of needs, determines appropriate program
assignments including career and technical education, work activities and employment,
academic activities..., counseling, alcohol and substance abuse treatment, and such
related activities as may be necessary to assist prisoners in the successful transition to free
society and gainful employment"). Interestingly, because Virginia prison administrators
have drawn from the statutory focus on rehabilitation of prisoners for "transition to free
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upheld Virginia's death row policy, stating that "Virginia law mandates that all
persons convicted of capital crimes are, upon receipt of a death sentence,
automatically confined to death row." 7 1 The court's statement here, however,
may mislead the reader. In Virginia, as in most states, there is no statutory
mandate to hold prisoners on death row. Death row in Virginia, as in many
other states, is a matter of administrative policy. 72
Of the thirty-one states with capital punishment and the additional state
with death-sentenced inmates, 73 only one-Missouri--has chosen to abolish
death row and fully integrate death-sentenced prisoners with noncapital
inmates in a general prison population. 74 Missouri's prison administrators did
so without any statutory mandate for or against death row, after a federal court
issued a consent decree requiring them to ameliorate death row conditions and
society," id § 53.1-32.1(A), the negative implication is that prisoners who are destined for
execution do not warrant such educational, work, and other programs. Prieto v. Clarke, No.
1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013) ("The VDOC's policy
toward death row inmates largely rests on two fundamental assumptions: first, that these
inmates inherently present a greater risk to prison safety because they 'have nothing to
lose,' and second, that they are less deserving of limited prison resources because they will
never reenter society."), rev'd on other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015).
71 Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 254 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). The court
may have perpetuated the confusion in a subsequent decision, in which it addressed the
liberty interests of prisoners who are "sentenced to confinement in the general prison
population," Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added), for
prison administrators, not sentencing authorities, determine the placement of prisoners. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-10 (granting authority to the Director of Corrections); id, § 53.132.1(A) (making the Director responsible for establishing a system of prisoner
classification).
72
1n the absence of statutory requirements, the segregation and isolation of deathsentenced prisoners result from administrative choices. Some states publish their policies.
See supra note 70; see also, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 291-093-0005(3) (2013),
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/rules/oars_200/oar_291/291_093.html [https://perma.cc/
7XVX-U3L2] ("Policy: It is the policy of the Department of Corrections to assign inmates
with a sentence of death to the Death Row Housing Unit or to a Death Row status cell.").
In California, the legislature has specified only that death-sentenced inmates be sent to the
prison where executions will take place-California State Prison at San Quentin. See CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 3600(a), 3602, 3603 (West 2011). Death-sentenced men go there directly;
death-sentenced women live in the Central California Women's Facility until the end of
their appeals. See id §§ 3601, 3602. In contrast, in Virginia, at least one of the prison
regulations governing death row confinement is not available on the Department of
Corrections website and was filed under seal when challenged recently in litigation. See Email from Michael Bern, Assoc., Latham & Watkins LLP (and counsel to Alfred Prieto), to
Marah Stith McLeod, Assoc. in Law, Columbia Law Sch. (July 1, 2015, 21:31 EST) (on
file with author).
73
New Mexico has abolished the death penalty only prospectively, and therefore still
holds prisoners under a sentence of death. See Death Row Inmates by State, supranote 49.
74
See infra note 100 and accompanying text. Note that Maryland also mainstreamed
its few remaining death-sentenced inmates after abolition of the death penalty, but those
inmates received commutations of their death sentences, and therefore Maryland no longer
has any death-sentenced inmate in its custody.
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to establish different custody levels for death-sentenced inmates. 7 5 In all other
capital punishment states, death-sentenced prisoners remain segregated as they
await execution.
Thus, death row accompanies the death penalty in nearly every capital
punishment state. Though a few state statutes require death row, in most states
prison administrators simply have retained it under their operating regulations.
It is remarkable that, in these states, prison administrators on their own have
established what scholars and courts increasingly recognize to be an "added
punishment" 76 and even "the punishment" 7 7 for prisoners sentenced to death.
The next Part of this Article will show that despite its widespread use,
death row is not an inevitable part of the death penalty. Instead, death row
requires a choice-a normative choice about what punishment is just.
Understanding the normative nature of the decision to establish death row
points to the final claim of this Article, made in Part IV: that legislatures, not
prison administrators, should decide whether to retain death row.
Ill. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DEATH Row

This Article has offered a brief account of the origins, prevalence, and
legal authority for death row. This Part will ask whether death row is
necessary, highlighting arguments for and against death row based on the four
traditional purposes of punishment. Whether to retain death row turns out to be
a primarily normative question, one that requires balancing the purposes and
harms of criminal punishment.
A. Is Death Row Necessary to Incapacitatethe Condemned?

Death row scholars have attributed death row conditions to "assumptions
that the nature of capital offenses renders death-sentenced inmates more likely
to assault and injure correctional personnel and other inmates in prison, and
75

See George Lombardi, Richard D. Sluder & Donald Wallace, The Management of
Death-Sentenced Inmates: Issues, Realities, and Innovative Strategies 7-8 (Mar. 1996)
(unpublished manuscript), https://doc.mo.gov/Documents/DeathSentencedlnmates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JK7-KAB2] (a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy
of Criminal Justice Sciences, Las Vegas, Nevada). A thirty-five-year veteran of Missouri's
Department of Corrections, George Lombardi has served as Director since 2008. Lombardi
has written about the harsh conditions of death row prior to abolition. See id. at 8
("[Previously] condemned prisoners in Missouri were housed on 'death row' . . , [in] a
below-ground unit ... completely segregated from the general inmate population. With
restrictions on movement and limited access to programs, conditions of confinement for
death row inmates mirrored those found in other states. Death row inmates did not leave
their housing unit. All services, including medical, recreation, food and legal materials,
were brought to condemned prisoners. Inmates were permitted one hour of outside exercise
each day in a small, fenced area by the unit.").
76
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
77
GARLAND, supra note 11, at 46 (emphasis added).
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that this risk is amplified by their having 'nothing to lose.'"7 8 In her work on
prison conditions, Mona Lynch has described how these assumptions have led
some states to place death-sentenced inmates into the harsh and extremely
isolating conditions of "supermax" confinement. She writes that "[p]enal
administrators justify the use of Supermax as necessary to maintain internal
security [for those] inmates who are defined as 'the worst of the worst."'

79

Some death-sentenced inmates have been found to pose a risk of future
dangerousness by the sentencing jury. Two states, Texas and Oregon, allow
the penalty of death only if the jury has made a finding of future
dangerousness. There, the state must prove to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." 80 In
another state, Virginia, the jury must make either a dangerousness finding, or
alternatively find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime committed was
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman." 81 Numerous other states

78 Lyon & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 2 (quoting James Flateau, spokesman for
the New York State Department of Correctional Services) (citing William Glaberson, On a
Reinvented Death Row, the Prisoners Can Only Wait, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/04/nyregion/on-a-reinvented-death-row-the-prisoners-canonly-wait.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/UQ4Y-QFZH]); see also Joint Appendix
at 639, Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-8021) (deposition of
Virginia Director of Corrections Harold Clarke) (stating that death row prisoners are
segregated because "we see those individuals as potentially the most desperate of all the
offenders. Again, they have been sentenced to die. They have nothing to lose. They don't
even look forward to a life in prison in which they can improve themselves, change their
ways, help other individuals for the rest of their life until they die of natural causes. They
have been sentenced to die and as soon as the appeal process is completed, a date is set,
that sentence will carry out.").
79
Lynch, supra note 6, at 68.
80
0R. REV. STAT. § 163.150(B) (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071,
§ 2(b)(1) (West 2006).
81 Virginia law sets forth the requirements as follows:
Conditions for imposition of death sentence.
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death
penalty may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or
jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or that his

conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an

aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be
imposed.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2015). Other states also authorize death sentences to be
based on findings of dangerousness and research suggests that dangerousness
considerations drive many capital determinations. See, e.g, Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky
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allow dangerousness findings to be used as an aggravating factor in capital
sentencing. 82
Assessments of future dangerousness to society in death sentencing have
been attacked as inaccurate, unjust, and perhaps not even relevant where the
alternative to a death sentence is life without parole (dangerousness to society
having begun to be considered at a time when the alternative to a death
sentence was a parole-eligible term). 83 Despite their claimed inaccuracy,
unfairness, and possible irrelevance, however, such future dangerousness
findings continue to be cited not only to support death sentences but to support
death row conditions. Indeed, prison officials in Virginia recently argued that
death-sentenced inmates categorically warrant stricter conditions of
confinement because their sentences are based on findings that they either
would commit violent crimes again or that their crimes were particularly
vile. 84
Several notable escapes from death row have contributed to the belief that
death-sentenced inmates are particularly dangerous and hard to control. In his
historical study of capital punishment in the United States, Robert Bohm
recounts several well-publicized escapes of death row inmates over the last
fifty years: 85 A woman, Marie Arrington, escaped from Florida's death row in
1969; six inmates escaped from Oklahoma's death row in 1972; four inmates
escaped from Georgia's death row in 1980; six inmates escaped from
Virginia's death row in 1984; six inmates attempted (and one succeeded in) an
escape from Texas's Huntsville prison in 1998; and another death row inmate
escaped from a county jail in Houston in 2005 after attending a resentencing. 86
L. Pilgrim, An Actuarial Risk Assessment of Violence Posed by Capital Murder
90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1252-53 (2000).
Defendants,
82
See Aletha M. Claussen-Schulz, Marc W. Pearce & Robert F. Schopp,
Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and CapitalSentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.

471, 479 (2004). These states include Missouri. See State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 54344 (Mo. 2010) (allowing prosecutors to argue future dangerousness as a non-statutory
aggravating factor).
83
See, e.g., John F. Edens, Jacqueline K. Buffington-Vollum, Andrea Keilen, Phillip
Roskamp, & Christine Anthony, Predictions of Future Dangerousnessin CapitalMurder
Trials: Is It Time to "Disinventthe Wheel?," 29 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 55, 58 (2005); see also
Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, IntegratingBase Rate Data in Violence Risk
Assessments at Capital Sentencing, 16 BEHAv. ScL & L. 71, 71-72 (1998). Future
dangerousness not only is difficult to predict, but predictions may be based on unrealistic
consideration of whether a guilty defendant would kill if released rather than whether he
would kill if kept in prison. On that topic, a recent article exposed how Virginia does not
allow the jury to hear evidence regarding the effect of prison conditions on future
dangerousness. See Andrew Lindsey, Death by Irrelevance: The Unconstitutionality of
Virginia's Continued Exclusion of Prison Conditions Evidence to Assess the Future
Dangerousness ofCapitalDefendants, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1257 (2014).
84
Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 54-56, Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245
(4th Cir.
2015) (No. 13-8021); see supra note 81 and accompanying text (citing statute).
85
BOHM, supra note 10, at 177-78.
86

Id
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These escapes caused great alarm, fueled by disturbing media reports.8 7 In
Virginia, the Mecklenberg prison became renowned for the death row escape
debacle.88 The escape led to a bevy of investigations, which resulted in
recommendations for better prison organization and morale through measures
that included "increased job, recreational and educational opportunities for
inmates." 89 Ultimately, however, Virginia prison officials chose to eliminate
opportunities for death-sentenced inmates, rather than to enhance them to
encourage good behavior: Death row was transferred to Sussex I State Prison,
where death-sentenced prisoners now live in solitary confinement. 90 Virginia
correctional officials have cited the 1984 escape incident to explain why the
current death row strictures are necessary.91
Despite the alarm generated by these escapes, however, the risk of escape
offers only a weak reason for condemning death-sentenced prisoners
categorically to harsher confinement. Though escapes by death-sentenced
prisoners may generate publicity, 9 2 research for this Article has found no study

or claim asserting that death-sentenced prisoners attempt to escape at higher
rates than other murderers sentenced to lesser penalties, or that deathsentenced prisoners are more likely than such other murderers to commit
violence during an escape. 93 Indeed, the escapes of death-sentenced prisoners
87

See id at 204 (citing news coverage).
When authorities decided to close the prison many years later, news articles
focused on this aspect of its history. See, e.g., McDonnell Orders Mecklenburg
88

Correctional

Center

Closed,

RICHMOND

TIMEs-DISPATCH

(Dec.

13,

2011),

http://www.richmond.com/archive/article_7d l5ef34-b4b3-5b72-87a0-3d4a6767b563.html
[https://perma.cc/U3TT-NWS4] ("About 300 people work at the Southside Virginia prison,
which in 1984 was the site of the nation's largest death row escape . . . .").
89
DARYL CUMBER DANCE, LONG GONE: THE MECKLENBURG SIX AND THE THEME OF
ESCAPE IN BLACK FOLKLORE 98 (1987).

90

See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that all deathsentenced inmates in Virginia are "housed in the same portion of Sussex I, known widely
as Virginia's 'death row."'); id at 253-54 (rejecting death row inmate's due process claim
for a right to housing in non-solitary confinement). Recent reports suggest that prison
administrators have ameliorated death row conditions in Virginia, apparently in order to
stave off further litigation. See Alanna Durkin, Virginia Quietly Grants Death Row Inmates
New Privileges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 16, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/2412
9250flb74fefb1c4d492lf3aal99/virginia-quietly-grants-death-row-inmates-new-privileges
[https://perma.cc/3QJD-CQRF].
91 Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants, supra note 84, at 15-16 ("Director Clarke
explained his concern that permitting death-row offenders to congregate with other
prisoners would pose an unacceptable safety risk. He described an incident in the 1980s in
which death-row inmates who had been permitted to congregate at the maximum security
prison in Mecklenberg 'staged a mass escape,' an incident that 'could have been
catastrophic' had they not been apprehended." (quoting Joint Appendix at 643)).
92
See BOHM, supra note 10, at 177-78 (recounting the history of death row escapes).
93
Bohm does not offer comparative evidence, unfortunately, between rates of escape
by death-sentenced inmates and noncapital inmates (such as LWOP or life inmates). See id
Studies have found that, generally speaking, only a small fraction of prison escapes
lead to injuries to staff. See, e.g., Richard F. Culp, Frequency and Characteristicsof Prison
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over the years have not resulted in the death of any third party. 94 All were
recaptured, except for two who died before being found. 9 5 With regard to the
risk of death row escapes, an event that occurred in 2004 in Arkansas is
telling. For three minutes, all the death row cell doors were accidentally
unlocked. 96 Though apparently aware, no death row inmate left his cell.97
Quoted in a news report after the incident, the spokeswoman for the Arkansas
prison system recounted: "[The prisoners] sat there. They didn't
98
move.... [T]he death row inmates are the best behaved inmates in prison."
In other words, the data we have suggests, at the very least, that not every
prisoner sentenced to death is a prisoner likely to escape or commit violence in
the future. 99 The claimed risk of escape by capital inmates is simply
insufficient to warrant subjecting every death-sentenced inmate automatically
to the harshness of permanent isolation.
More importantly, recent and ongoing evidence further undercuts the
general assumption that death-sentenced inmates will always be exceptionally
dangerous. The best evidence comes from the Missouri prison system, which
Escapes in the United States: An Analysis of National Data, 85 PRISON J. 270, 285, 2S7
(2005) (describing a study of news reports regarding escapes over a two-year period in
which "[e]scapees used violence against prison staff in only . . . 8.3% of the escapes,"
"none of the incidents resulted in life-threatening injuries," and "all of the escaped
prisoners involved ... were subsequently captured, most within a few days of the escape").
Unfortunately, studies offer little means to compare rates of escape by prisoners sentenced
to terms of years and death-sentenced prisoners. Indeed, some studies code death sentences
as terms of years. See, e.g., Bryce E. Peterson, Inmate-, Incident-, and Facility-Level
Factors Associated with Escapes from Custody and Violent Outcomes 105 n.24 (Feb. 1,
2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York), http://academic
works.cuny.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1605&context-gcetds [https://perma.cc/GVP2-

FQ83].

94

BOHM, supranote 10, at 178.
1d (describing the recapture of all escapees but two who were found dead). The
bodies of the two who died were found within a week of their escapes; one was found
beaten to death and the other had apparently drowned (in a separate incident). Id
96
Death-Row Cells Are Unlocked by Accident, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2004),
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jan/30/nation/na-briefs30.1 [https://perma.cc/3T7R-D4J4].
95

97

1d

98

Id. (quoting Dina Tyler, spokeswoman for the Arkansas prison system).
There may be reasons why death-sentenced inmates might not be more likely to
escape or more likely to commit violence, as a category, than murderers sentenced to lesser
terms. As an initial matter, though death row prisoners often are treated as a unique
category, their crimes do not necessarily set them apart from all other prisoners. Other
inmates may have committed capital crimes, but had prosecutors who did not pursue the
death penalty, avoided the death penalty through plea bargains, or faced juries that
exercised mercy. Death-sentenced prisoners, moreover, may be older on average. In 2013,
death-sentenced prisoners had a mean age of forty-seven and a median age of forty-six. See
SNELL, supra note 9, at 10 tbl.5. In contrast, that same year less than thirty percent of all
state and federal prisoners, including noncapital prisoners, were over forty-four years old.
99

See E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 8 tbl.7 (Sept. 2014),

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8F7-7D9A].
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abolished death row and integrated its death-sentenced inmates with
noncapital inmates at its maximum security Potosi Correctional Center over
twenty years ago. 0 0 Rather than automatically sending every death-sentenced
prisoner into high-security segregation on death row, Missouri prison officials
began to evaluate each prisoner individually for risk of institutional violence
and to determine a custody level accordingly.' 0 ' For the first time, evidence of
likely institutional behavior (including a variety of factors such as
psychological traits and past prison behavior), rather than the mere fact of a
death sentence, mattered for placement in segregation.1 02
As a result of the integration, within just over a decade eighty-four percent
of the death-sentenced inmates in the Missouri prison system (then sixty-two
prisoners) had been placed in some form of general population housing,
including twenty-one percent who were placed in the "honor dorm" reserved
for exceptionally well-behaved inmates.1 0 3 Prisoners in the honor dorm
remained out of their cells at all times except during roll call.104 Only five
percent of the death-sentenced prisoners had required segregated confinement
due to the risks they posed to others or for disciplinary reasons. 0 5 The
abolition of death row greatly improved life for death-sentenced prisoners,
and-according to the current Director of the Missouri Department of
Corrections, George Lombardi-also improved the "general climate and
environment of the institution."' 06
When studying reports from the Missouri Department of Corrections
eleven years after mainstreaming, forensic psychologists Mark Cunningham
and Thomas Reidy, assisted by criminal justice professor Jon Sorensen, made
several surprising discoveries. 10 7 They found that the mainstreamed deathsentenced inmates were significantly less likely to commit violent misconduct
than prisoners sentenced to a term of years in the same facility. 0 8 Indeed, the
rate of violent misconduct for death-sentenced inmates (and also for prisoners
sentenced to life without parole (LWOP)) was only one-fifth of the rate of
violent misconduct among parole-eligible inmates at the same facility. 0 9
Even after accounting for predictor variables such as age and education,
the findings were remarkable: "Controlling for all of these predictor
100For the history of Missouri's abolition of death row, see generally Lombardi,
Sluder & Wallace, supra note 56.
101 See Cunningham, Reidy & Sorensen, supra note 22, at 311.
102
See id at 310-11.
1031d at 316 (recounting this information based on a personal communication with
Don Roper, then the superintendent of Potosi Correctional Center).
104 Id at 311.
105
Id at 312.
106
Lombardi, Sluder & Wallace, supranote 56, at 7.
107
Cunningham, Reidy & Sorensen, supra note 22. Mark Cunningham has advised
this author in a personal telephone conversation on March 3, 2015, that he is conducting a
follow-up
study that will update the results of his study of the Missouri experience.
108

Id at315.

109Id at 316.
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variables .. . death-sentenced and LWOP inmates were half as likely to engage
in violent misconduct as term-sentenced inmates housed under similar
conditions of confinement at [Potosi Correctional Center]." 10 Furthermore,
none of the death-sentenced inmates attempted to escape during the study
period, and Cunningham has heard of no subsequent escape attempt by a
death-sentenced inmate in Missouri. 1 1
The fact that both LWOP and death-sentenced inmates "were significantly
less likely than parole eligible inmates to be involved in violent
misconduct" 1l 2 bears attention. For LWOP inmates, like death-sentenced
inmates, have little hope of release.1 13 The evidence from Missouri thus
unsettles the claim that such prisoners categorically pose higher risks and
therefore must be confined more strictly.
At least two factors may explain why mainstreamed death-sentenced
inmates would commit relatively low rates of misconduct. The first reason is
that these inmates acquire something to lose when they are given more
privileges. 114 When death-sentenced inmates are not automatically and
categorically segregated and isolated on death row, the threat of segregation
and isolation may be used to deter them from misconduct, just as this threat
deters noncapital prisoners from prison misconduct. This would explain why
Missouri's mainstreamed inmates committed relatively low levels of violent
misconduct. It might also explain why they did not attempt to escape, for if
recaptured they faced return to solitary confinement as a consequence. 115
A second reason may help explain why death-sentenced inmates in the
Missouri study committed less violent misconduct than inmates with lower
sentences: Death-sentenced inmates may view prison differently because they
expect to be there for the rest of their lives. They may see the importance of
establishing a good reputation and good rapport with prison officials more
Ill Id Cunningham stated to this author in February 2015 that to date, his research has
revealed no attempts to escape by the death-sentenced inmates who were mainstreamed in
Missouri.
112
See id at 313.
113
See BOiM, supra note 10, at 181 (describing how LWOP and death-sentenced
inmates
may be seen to have little to lose because both have no hope of release).
114
Lombardi, Sluder & Wallace, supra note 56, at 7.
115 The mainstreamed prisoners' temporary experience of life in isolation on death row
may have had a specific deterrent effect, for it gave them a personal understanding of the
hardship of isolated confinement-to which they might be returned based on misconduct.
See infra note 183. (discussing whether temporary placement on death row might serve
specific deterrence purposes). An updated study of the conduct of Missouri deathsentenced inmates would lend insight into whether prisoners' former placement on death
row has had a specific deterrent effect on them. Mark Cunningham has indicated to the
author that he plans to conduct such a study. No reports to date suggest that violence
among death-sentenced prisoners in Missouri has increased. And the Director of
Corrections continues to post prominently on his state website his article lauding the
positive effects of abolishing death row in Missouri. See Office of the Director, Mo. DEP'T
CoRR., https://doc.mo.gov/OD/ [https://perma.cc/T7G9-AEGH].
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than inmates who expect to spend a shorter time in prison.11 6 They may
recognize that the loss of even small privileges, such as contact visits with
family and increased time for recreation, may affect dramatically their quality
of life over the long term. This long-term view could explain why deathsentenced and LWOP inmates would commit less violent misconduct than
parole-eligible inmates, and why LWOP inmates would commit the least
violence of all. 117
The mainstreaming experience in Missouri offers strong empirical support
for the claim that not all death-sentenced inmates pose a higher risk of prison
violence."t 8 Earlier studies bolster that account, though they did not study
prisoner conduct after abolition of death row. Some studies revealed relatively
low rates of violence for inmates who were still on death row." 9 Other studies
found relatively low rates of violence of former death row inmates who, after
their death sentences were vacated, were incarcerated in the general
population.1 20 The Missouri study also accords with broader studies of
recidivism, which show that a crime of conviction is a poor predictor of
116

Timothy Flanagan's extensive studies have documented this explanation for the
behavior of long-term inmates. See Timothy J. Flanagan, Long-Term Incarceration:Issues
of Science, Policy and Correctional Practice, in LONG-TERM IMPRISONMENT: POLICY,
SCIENCE, AND CORRECTIONAL PRACTICE 3, 5 (Timothy J. Flanagan ed., 1995).

&

&

117 Cunningham, Reidy & Sorensen, supra note 22, at 313. Furthermore, the possibility
of enhancing the likelihood of post-conviction relief might also motivate death-sentenced
inmates toward good behavior. A federal court recently noted, in rejecting the claim that
death-sentenced inmates have "nothing to lose": "Death row inmates have obvious
incentives to behave well and take rehabilitation seriously, including the possibility that
new forensic evidence might undercut a conviction, a habeas petition might be granted, or
that good behavior might improve the prospects of a commuted sentence." Prieto v. Clarke,
No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013), rev'd on other
grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015).
118No evidence suggests that Missouri's corrections facility or death-sentenced
prisoners are so different as to make this evidence inapplicable elsewhere. Nor does the
Cunningham study of the Missouri experience suggest that good behavior was simply the
immediate result of the transition and due to the inmate's recent experience with the
suffering of death row (segregation to which they would not want to be returned for
committing acts of prison violence). See Cunningham, Reidy & Sorensen, supra note 22.
19
See, e.g., Jon Sorensen & Robert D. Wrinkle, No Hope for Parole: Disciplinary
Infractions Among Death-Sentenced and Life-Without-Parole Inmates, 23 CRIM. JUST.
BEHAv. 542, 547 (1996). Such studies offered important information, but could not
exclude the possibility that violence had been suppressed by death row confinement
measures.
120
See, e.g., Thomas J. Reidy, Mark D. Cunningham & Jon R. Sorensen, From Death
to Life: Prison Behavior of Former Death Row Inmates in Indiana, 28 CRIM. JUST.
BEHAV. 62, 70 (2001); see also Sorensen & Wrinkle, supra note 119, at 542. These studies
avoided the problem of security effects, and provided important insights indicating that
most capital offenders did not pose special risks of violence. But they could not foreclose
the possibility that death row prisoners became less dangerous because they no longer
faced execution or remembered and wanted to avoid being placed in segregated
confinement again.
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violence in prison. Specifically, studies have indicated that "a murder
conviction is not predictive of a greater risk of prison violence relative to a
conviction for some other offense."'21 And "research has consistently found
the true incidence of recidivism among murderers released from prison to be
much lower than for other types of parolees." 2 2 Furthermore, studies have
shown that the risk of violence by prisoners decreases significantly as they
age.1 23 Many death row prisoners are quite old; a recent government report
counted over 350 death row inmates aged sixty or older. 124 In the last decades,
hundreds have died awaiting execution. 12 5 As death-sentenced prisoners age in
the many years leading up to execution, their permanent isolation on death row
becomes less and less justified for security reasons. An accumulating body of
evidence thus supports the claim that death-sentenced inmates do not pose
exceptional security threats as a categorical matter.
This growing evidence has undercut the dangerousness rationale for death
row. Security needs do not require a death sentence to be dispositive for
automatic and permanent placement on death row. Individual assessments of
death-sentenced offenders offer a way to determine which inmates require
more restrictive confinement-assessments that are made routinely for
noncapital prisoners.1 2 6
121 Jon Sorensen & Mark D. Cunningham, Conviction Offense and Prison Violence: A
Comparative Study of Murderers and Other Offenders, 56 CRIME & DELINQ. 103, 123
(2010). Perhaps, one might argue, death-sentenced inmates commit even less violence if
they are kept in isolation on segregated death rows. Some researchers suggest otherwisearguing that the isolation can catalyze violence. The United Kingdom's Chief Inspector of
Prisons found that the use of solitary confinement was causing inmates to become more
violent. See Alan Travis, Solitary 'Makes DangerousInmates Worse,'GUARDIAN (Mar. 21,
2000), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/mar/22/alantravis [https://perma.cc/X57N-L9RQ].
In any case, the argument for less misconduct would justify stricter security measures for
other, noncapital prisoners as well. The question remains: why create death row?
122 Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 81, at 1254. The recidivism question seems
important. Jonathan Sorensen has argued that "both correctional administrators and inmates
agree that murderers are generally among the most docile and trustworthy inmates in the
institution." Id at 1256. With regard to death-sentenced inmates, he notes that death row
inmates whose penalties were commuted after Furman had a low rate of recidivism. See id
at 1255.
1 2 3 See, e.g., CARLYNE L. KUJATH, DAN PACHOLKE, DAVE DANIELS & BRUCE STEGNER,
WASH. STATE DEP'T OF CORR., PRISON VIOLENCE: PRELIMINARY STUDY 2 (Oct. 2009)

("Analyses indicated a negative relationship between age and violent behavior (e.g., as age
increased, the number of violent infractions decreased). This suggests that older offenders
are less likely than younger offenders, to be violent."), http://www.doc.wa.gov/aboutdoc/
measuresstatistics/docs/PrisonViolence2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QEZ-M6M5].
1 24 See SNELL, supra note 9, at 21 app. tbl.1.
1 2 5 See supra note 11.
1 26 The district court in the Virginia death row case mentioned above reached this
conclusion, finding that the Virginia prison administrators' concerns for security could be
adequately addressed through individual assessments of death-sentenced inmates for
dangerousness. See Prieto v. Clarke, No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *1l (E.D.
Va. Nov. 12, 2013) ("[D]efendants could provide plaintiff with an individualized
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But it is not yet clear that death row serves no legitimate penological
purpose. For other traditional punishment purposes--rehabilitation,
retribution, and deterrence-still might be served by death row. 127 Without
considering these other purposes of punishment, one cannot conclude that
death row has no legitimate place in capital punishment. The Article now will
turn to whether death row may serve the aim of rehabilitation.
B. Is Death Row Necessary to Rehabilitate the Condemned?
Historically, states hoped that pre-execution confinement would facilitate
rehabilitation of the offender. In colonial days, executions were delayed
intentionally for up to a few weeks to enable death-sentenced inmates to
meditate on their crimes and potential damnation, and with the help of visits
from clergy, to express remorse and repent.1 28 Pre-execution confinement thus
classification determination using procedures that are the same or substantially similar to
the procedures used for all non-capital offenders, as plaintiff requests."), rev'd on other
grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). While the decision of the district court recently was
reversed, that aspect of the decision was not rejected. See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245,
251 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that the prisoner did not have a liberty interest triggering a
right to procedural review before confinement on death row).
As a group of corrections experts recently argued in the Prieto case, moreover,
individual assessments rather than automatic and permanent isolation are a sufficient and
effective method to preserve prison security. See Brief of Amici Curiae Correctional
Experts in Support of Appellee, supra note 54, at 3 ("Amici have first-hand experience in
safely managing death-sentenced and other maximum-security populations.... It is
amici's view that the Virginia Department of Corrections policy of automatically and
permanently placing death-sentenced prisoners in solitary confinement is a violation of
prisoners' due process rights and serves no correctional purpose."). The amicus brief cited
evidence from Missouri as well as other studies on the comparative non-dangerousness of
capital inmates. See id at 23-28. The state had opposed vigorously the consideration of
this amicus brief. See Commonwealth's Opposition to Correctional Experts' Motion to File
Amicus Brief, Prieto, 780 F.3d 245 (No. 13-8021). But, in testimony, even the Virginia
prison director conceded that some death-sentenced inmates do not pose a higher risk than
noncapital inmates. See Opening Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 54-55, Prieto, 780 F.3d
245 (No. 13-8021) ("In fact, however, Director Clarke himself expressly agreed that there
are 'individuals within death row who are less of a security risk than particular individuals
in the general population."' (quoting Joint Appendix at 657)). Based on such evidence, the
district court concluded that prison administrators' policy of automatically placing all
death-sentenced inmates in solitary confinement on death row was based on unsupported
"assumptions" about the dangerousness of death-sentenced inmates and "further[ed] few, if
any, legitimate penological goals." Prieto, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8.
127 In his history of the death penalty, Banner notes that capital punishment enjoyed
widespread support in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for three main purposes:
deterrence, retribution, and penitence. See BANNER, supra note 35, at 23.
128
BOHM, supra note 10, at 2. Banner also recounts that in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, "[t]he condemned person was normally allowed at least a week or
two, and often several weeks, to get ready to die." BANNER, supra note 35, at 17. Though
execution delay "attenuat[ed] the link between the crime and the punishment" and created a
risk of escape, "governments continued to allow sufficient time for repentance" and
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was designed to rehabilitate the soul of the offender. This purpose of preexecution confinement can be seen in the words of Massachusetts Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw in 1839, when he warned a defendant he was sentencing
to death to use his remaining time in preparation for "the great change that
awaits you."' 2 9
Some remnants of the historical aim of rehabilitation appear in current
death row policy, despite the fact that secular aims largely have displaced
religious purposes in American penal policy.130 Some statutes still expressly
provide for visitation by clergy to death row inmates. 131 And some prison
administrators have sought to make death row an environment that draws
inmates' thoughts toward God.1 32 Literature and books have depicted famous
religious conversions on death row.1 33
provided for a "steady stream of ministers" to visit the inmates and encourage their
and penitence. See id. at 17-19.
conversation
29

1 LEMUEL SHAW, REMARKS OF CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW WHEN PASSING SENTENCE OF
DEATH UPON NATHAN SMITH, FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER, JUNE 7, 1839, at 6 (1839). Note

that one might also see retributive goals to be served by penitence; Michael Simons has
written that "repentance exacts a punishment from the defendant." Michael A. Simons,
Born Again on Death Row: Retribution, Remorse, and Religion, 43 CATH. LAW. 311, 331
(2004).
130
Cf BOHM, supra note 10, at 3 ("Penitence is no longer an ostensible goal of capital
punishment.... In addition, with the current separation of church and state, religion no
longer has the influence in secular affairs as it did during colonial times.").
131 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-31.1 (Supp. 2015) (barring access to the
prisoner by anyone except correctional staff, "the defendant's counsel, members of the
clergy if requested by the defendant, and members of the defendant's family"); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.17 (West 2006) (barring all persons outside the prison from
access to a death-sentenced inmate "except his or her physician, lawyer, and
clergyperson, . . . and the relatives and friends of the condemned person"); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 7-13-907(a) (2015) (requiring death-sentenced inmates to be held in solitary
confinement but allowing certain visitation including by "spiritual advisers of the
prisoner").
132
See Michael J. Osofsky, Albert Bandura & Philip G. Zimbardo, The Role of Moral
Disengagement in the Execution Process, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 371, 377 (2005)
(describing one of the penitentiaries studied as focused strongly on directing death row
inmates toward religious development through means including religious counseling and
religious art).
133 See, e.g., HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: THE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF
THE DEATH PENALTY THAT SPARKED A NATIONAL DEBATE 244 (1994); DEAD MAN

WALKING (PolyGram Films 1995).
Some scholars have argued that newfound faith on death row may be a reason to
conclude that a death-sentenced inmate should not be executed after all, either because he
is no longer deserving of death or because he is no longer too dangerous to keep alive. See,
e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry? The
Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1633 (1998) ("In short,
if jurors believed that the defendant was sorry for what he had done, they tended to
sentence him to life imprisonment, not death."); Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and
Criminal Punishment: An Analysis of Popular Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 168, 171
(Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (citing Dead Man Walking to show how remorse impacts
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The historical rehabilitative purpose of pre-execution confinement,
however, now offers little reason for death row. Pre-execution confinement
lasts far too long to provide the temporal pressure that historically was seen to
foster repentance. In 1839, New York minister John McLeod explained the
importance of a short period of pre-execution confinement:
May we not fairly reason from what we know of the nature of the mind, and
the deceitfulness of sin, that the criminal will be more likely to give all the
energies of his mind to the work of preparation for meeting his God, when he
knows that his days are numbered, than when they appear to him to be
lengthened out indefinitely? 1 34
Today, prisoners who are executed spend an average of a decade and a
half on death row-and most prisoners sentenced to death are not executed at
all.1 3 5 The religiously oriented purpose of pre-execution confinement would
seem at most to justify special prison conditions designed to focus the prisoner
on his eternal fate for the limited period immediately preceding his
execution. 136
One scholar has suggested an alternative, secular rehabilitative purpose for
the segregated confinement of death-sentenced prisoners. Criminologist
Robert Johnson has argued for a "humane death row," where death-sentenced
inmates receive more caring treatment than other inmates. He contends that
prisons should provide a special type of confinement for death-sentenced
inmates that would mitigate the psychological and physical harms of preexecution delay and prepare them for a dignified death. He argues that deathsentenced inmates are "persons in the process of dying at the hands of the
state, a class of individuals analogous to and as deserving of humane care as

social judgments of character and desert); Simons, supra note 129, at 322 (noting that a
jury faced with evidence of a capital defendant's religious transformation "may have
considered it relevant to [the defendant's] desert (i.e., not simply relevant to his future
dangerousness)").
134 BANNER, supra note 35, at 123 (quoting New York minister John McLeod).
135
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
1361t seems hard to imagine that death-sentenced inmates would spend so many years
"giv[ing] all the energies of [their] mind[s] to the work of preparation for meeting [their]
God," BANNER, supra note 35, at 123 (quoting New York minister John McLeod),
particularly when they (or their lawyers) know that they will not be executed until the end
of appellate and post-conviction review. The idea that prisoners on death row today
constantly fear imminent execution seems implausible, though it has been made in
prominent scholarship. See, e.g., Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense
of the Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 407, 462 (2005) ("During the time an offender is on death row, he constantly
fears that today is the day death comes knocking, making it hard for him to actually lend
much thought to the values animating retributive justice."); Sun, supra note 2, at 1613
(describing life on death row as "life in perpetual fear of state-implemented death, whose
timing is impossible to predict").
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terminally ill patients."'13 He envisions death row as a kind of hospice.1 38
Johnson's vision of death row would require states to treat death-sentenced
inmates better than noncapital inmates; it seems to justify the creation of death
row, but one very different from the harsh death row we see today.
Many scholars have argued that death row as it exists today degrades
rather than rehabilitates. Mona Lynch describes the harsh conditions of death
row as part of a "post-rehabilitative, 'waste management' new penological
regime." 39 Lynch writes that death row conditions are "literally transforming
those waiting to die from sociologically and psychologically rich human
beings into a kind of untouchable toxic waste that need only be securely
contained until its final disposal." 1 40
To prison administrators who decide death row policy, rehabilitation may
seem pointless. In the litigation over Virginia death row conditions in the
Prieto case mentioned above, state prison officials defended the categorical
denial of work and educational privileges to death-sentenced inmates on the
ground "that they are less deserving of limited prison resources because they
will never reenter society." 1 41 This utilitarian argument ascribes little or no
137 ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS

213 (2d ed. 1998). Johnson states that a humane death row "would be staffed by mature,
service-oriented correctional officers able to relate to condemned prisoners as persons in
the process of dying at the hands of the state, a class of individuals analogous to and as
deserving of humane care as terminally ill patients." Id He writes that:
Visits would be encouraged, as would recreational activities and "programs of work or
study that can take place in cells or in small groups." Also encouraged would be "selfhelp programs, preferably developed by and for the prisoners," which would be
promoted as "collective adaptations to the stresses of death row confinement" and
impending execution.

Id. at 214 (quoting Robert Johnson, Life Under Sentence of Death, in THE PAINS OF
IMPRISONMENT 142-44 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1988)).
138Id at 213-14.
139
Lynch, supra note 6, at 79. Echoing Michel Foucault but without directly citing
him, Sharon Dolovich has made similar claims about the American "carceral state" as a
whole. See Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the CarceralState, 16 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 259, 318 (2011). Both of these approaches treat conditions of confinement as
efforts at subjugation and exclusion of certain offenders, not as the punishment calibrated
to a particular crime. In this sense, their vision does not offer an explanation of death row
as necessary to capital punishment but instead as a reflection of broader, excessively harsh
carceral norms.
140 Lynch, supra note 6, at 79.
141 Prieto v. Clarke, No. 1:12-CV- 1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov.
12,
2013), rev'don other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). Perhaps the officials meant to
say that death-sentenced prisoners "are less deserving of limited prison resources because
they will never enter prison society." If the view were premised instead on the idea that
death-row inmates will not be released, the same rationale would justify subjecting LWOP
inmates to harsh treatment as well. See id ("[The rationale for limiting resources spent on
inmates who will not reenter society is] also inconsistent with [prison] practices. Compare
the treatment of inmates sentenced to death and those sentenced to life imprisonment

556

OHIO STATELAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 77:3

value to the human development of prisoners who are marked for execution,
treating such inmates, in Lynch's words, as human "waste." 4 2
But the argument that rehabilitation is wasted on death row inmates
because they will never reenter ordinary society, or even prison society,
presumes that death-sentenced inmates will be executed. That is not true.
Many death-sentenced inmates will not be executed. Recent records from the
Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that over forty percent of the persons
sentenced to death between 1976 and 2013 were removed from death row due
to court decisions or commutations. 143 An earlier and more detailed study
conducted by James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Valerie West had found that
over half of capital sentences from 1973 to 1995 were reversed based on
prejudicial error. 14 Some death row inmates will end up with sentences of life
in prison. A much smaller number will be exonerated. 14 5 Thus some of these
inmates initially placed on death row will reenter society-at least the larger
prison community. The claim that rehabilitation is wasted on death-sentenced
inmates because they will never reenter society is not only morally
questionable but often factually incorrect.1 46 Any death row that is retained
should prepare its inmates for the possibility of eventual reentry into human
community, because many of its inmates will do so. 147 Thus, rehabilitation
without the possibility of parole. Although the VDOC's stated reasons for separating death
row inmates and denying them programming apply with equal force to both classes,
inmates serving life sentences are presumptively assigned to the general population units at
SISP, where they may avail themselves of limited programming.").
14 2
See Lynch, supra note 6, at 79.
1 4 3 See SNELL, supra note 9, at 19 tbl.16; see also Gross, O'Brien, Hu & Kennedy,
supra note 11, at 7230-31.
1 4 4 JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR

RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995, at i (June 2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/
instructionalservices/liebman/liebman final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MZC-5JWQ].
145 Since 1973, 156 persons sentenced to death have been found innocent, according to
the Death Penalty Information Center. See Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty
[https://perma.cc/EE4J-HD5C] (including in the list of innocent persons those who were
sentenced to death but later were acquitted of all charges related to the alleged capital
crime, had all charges relating to the alleged capital crime dismissed by the prosecution, or
were pardoned based on evidence of innocence). Some scholars have attempted to calculate
the percent of inmates who are innocent, but not necessarily exonerated. See Gross,
O'Brien, Hu & Kennedy, supra note 11, at 7230 ("The high rate of exoneration among
death-sentenced defendants appears to be driven by the threat of execution, but most deathsentenced defendants are removed from death row and resentenced to life imprisonment,
after which the likelihood of exoneration drops sharply.").
146 The resource conservation claim might support treating death-sentenced inmates
harshly after all court review is completed (though under the Supreme Court's recent
jurisprudence they may always present a claim of actual innocence). But it offers little
justification for the immediate and permanent denial of human interaction and privileges to
all death-sentenced inmates.
14 7
See LIEBMAN, FAGAN & WEST, supra note 144, at ii (recounting the high rates of
sentencing error).
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provides no justification for the debilitating conditions of death row that
prevail today.
C. Is Death Row Necessaryfor Retributive Justice?
Advocates of retributive punishment might view the idea of a
rehabilitative death row-particularly the "humane death row" that Johnson
proposes 148-as profoundly unjust. One self-professed advocate of retributive
punishment is Robert Blecker, who contends that justice requires harsh death
row conditions. 149 According to Blecker, prevailing death row conditions are
far too lenient.15 0 In his 2013 book, The Death of Punishment, Blecker
recounts life on death row. His book focuses in particular on the lives and
executions of inmates he interviewed in Florida and Tennessee. 151 Blecker
describes seeing death row inmates playing games and watching television.1 52
He contrasts the way that the death row inmates lived with the way in which
they made their victims suffer. In gruesome detail, Blecker recounts how one
death row inmate in Florida, Danny Rolling, mercilessly raped, murdered, and
gutted a young university student and killed four other students in a killing
spree.1 53 He recounts how Florida death row prisoner David Keen raped an
eight-year-old child, strangled her with a shoelace, and dumped her, still
living, into a river. 154 And he describes how Daryl Holton, an inmate confined
on death row in Tennessee, took his unsuspecting children into his garage,
lined them up two at a time, and shot them to death. 5 5 To Blecker, death row
is not nearly harsh enough in light of these prisoners' crimes.
Retributive justice, Blecker contends, requires punishment that far better
fits the crime. He proposes a "model" death penalty statute in which deathsentenced inmates live in "permanent punitive segregation":
Those condemned to die . . . shall be permanently housed in a separate
prison [wing], with their daily conditions no better than prisoners already
subject to punitive or administrative segregation for the worst prison
infractions. Specifically, within constitutional bounds, those condemned to
death . .. shall have only the minimum constitutionally mandated exercise,

14 8

1

49

JOHNSON, supra note 137, at 213-14.

See

BLECKER,

supra note 26, at 205 (recounting his testimony to the Connecticut

legislature that "[t]his legislature should specify that harsher punishment shall attach on
death row"); cf id at 89 ("Witnessing the execution, I shuddered. It felt too much like a
hospital or hospice where I watched my father-in-law die mercifully. How we kill those we
condemn should in no way resemble how we kill those we love.").
150Id
151 See generally id
152 See, e.g., id at 130, 161.
153 Id at 76-77.

I54 Id at 99.
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BLECKER, supra note 26, at 110-11.
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recreation, phone calls, or physical contact. They shall not be permitted any
communal form of play.
Their sole food shall be nutraloaf, nutritionally complete and tasteless.
Photographs of their victims shall be posted in their cells, out of reach, in
visibly conspicuous places.1 56
Blecker criticizes prison officials for providing too many privileges to
death-sentenced inmates out of a self-interested desire to make the inmates
easier to handle and thus their own lives easier. 15 7 From his perspective,
lenient treatment of death-sentenced criminals tends to be unjustly generous
and leaves "[t]he nature of the crime .. . completely severed from the
experience of the punishment." 5 8
Blecker's depiction of current death row conditions as lenient seems
startling and inconsistent with the representations of death row conditions as
extraordinarily harsh presented by so many scholars and studies.1 59 But he
does not appear to have focused on states where prisoners are held in solitary
confinement or denied most human interactions. In his book, Blecker describes
1 561d. at 282 (second alteration in original). Legislatures have sometimes embraced the
idea of a limited diet as punishment. The Supreme Court's decision in Holden v. Minnesota
cites an 1868 statute requiring life-sentenced prisoners to be:
[P]unished by imprisonment at hard labor in the state prison . .. with solitary
confinement upon bread and water diet for twelve days in each year during the term,
to be apportioned in periods of not exceeding three days' duration each, with an
interval of not less than fourteen days intervening each two successive periods.
137 U.S. 483, 488 (1890). And a trial court not long ago required, as part of the sentence of

a capital prisoner, that he have to face pictures of his victims in his cell every day. See
Associated Press, Man Who Threw Kids off Bridge Gets Death-Judge Also Orders That
He Be Shown Photos of Children Every Day, NBC NEws (Apr. 30, 2009),

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/30500905/ns/usnews-crime _and courts/t/man-who-threw-kidsbridge-gets-death/ [https://perma.cc/5KXT-2C83]. Later, the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed the man's conviction and ordered a new trial, but the Supreme Court of
Alabama reversed again and remanded, and on remand the lower appellate court affirmed
the death sentence. See Luong v. State, No. 1121097, 2014 WL 983288, at *19 (Ala. Mar.
14, 2014), as modified on denial of reh'g (May 23, 2014); Luong v. State, No. CR-081219, 2015 WL 1780094, at *50 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2015) (per curiam), reh'g
denied, No. CR-08-1219, 2015 WL 4162926 (Ala. Crim. App. July 10, 2015), and cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1494 (2016).
15 7

BLECKER, supra note 26, at 165 (citing the perspective of a warden's assistant in

Oklahoma: "We make it easy for them because it's easy for us when it's easy for them.").
Johnson, who demands more humane conditions on death row, seems to agree that
appeasement is undesirable. He argues that some officers grant privileges out of fear of the
prisoners. JOHNSON, supra note 137, at 111.
1 58 BLECKER, supra note 26, at 166.

159 See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 6, at 8; FIDH & CCR, supra note 2, at 4; Cunningham
& Vigen, supra note 56, at 204; Johnson & Carroll, supra note 16, at 8-3; Lombardi,
Sluder & Wallace, supra note 56, at 3.
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his experiences in a handful of states that do offer some privileges to death
row inmates, 160 including the opportunity to exercise with one another, which
are not granted in many other capital punishment states. 16 1 At least eleven
other capital punishment states report that they do not permit death row
inmates to engage in any congregate activities. 162 Some states, including
Arizona, hold their death-sentenced inmates in supermax confinement, as
Lynch has described.1 63 Blecker might be pleased to find out that, at least in
some states, his arguments for retributive justice are defenses of much of the
status quo.
Though Blecker's demands for harsh death row conditions may seem
extreme, retributive justifications for harsh prison conditions are not new. In
the late eighteenth century, some critics of the penal system advocated harsher
prison conditions in lieu of capital punishment; they urged states to seal
prisoners away in remote locations where prisoners would be forced to
meditate on their offenses without any visitors.164 Blecker simply wants some
murderers to get both punishments-harsh conditions and death as well.1 65
Blecker offers a particularly harsh vision of death row; other retributive
justice advocates might desire death row to be harsh, but not quite so severe,
perhaps seeking to combine the purposes of retributive justice with those of
rehabilitation. Stephanos Bibas has advocated involving inmates in restorative
justice, to repair some of the harm done by their crimes, but at the same time
he has criticized other advocates of restorative justice who would "sweep
away the traditional goals and processes of criminal justice" and who view
"retribution for retribution's sake [as] pointless." 66 He has written:

160 See, e.g., ASCA HOUsING POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 19, 23 (indicating that
death-sentenced inmates may exercise with one another in Florida and Tennessee);
BLECKER, supra note 26, at 78 (describing how death row inmates are permitted to play
basketball with one another in Florida); id. at 162 (mentioning his experiences with death
rows in Florida, Oklahoma, and Tennessee). Blecker describes seeing Oklahoma
condemned prisoners playing basketball together. That seems inconsistent with prison
officials' claims in the ASCA Housing Policy Survey. See ASCA HOUSING POLICY
SURVEY, supra note 14, at 14, 22 (stating that Oklahoma inmates sentenced to death are not
permitted to participate in congregate activities and are not allowed movement even within
the death row unit unless in restraints). Perhaps Oklahoma's policy has changed, or
perhaps
it was not being enforced during Blecker's visit.
61
1 ASCA HOUSING POLICY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 9-32.
1 6 2 Id at 9-16.

1 63 See Lynch, supra note 6, at 66.
1 6 4 BANNER, supra note 35, at 109.

1 65 Blecker would eliminate some standard aggravators, including felony murder and
premeditation, thus excluding a number of murderers eligible under current capital
punishment statutes in the United States. See BLECKER, supra note 26, at 279.
166
Stephanos Bibas, Restoration, but Also More Justice, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 595, 596 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan eds., 2009).
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[P]unishment is supposed to hurt. The bite of punishment sends an
unequivocal message condemning the wrongdoer and vindicating the victim.
It pays the criminal's debt to society. It teaches criminals and others not to
hurt others, humbling proud wrongdoers. Restitution and fines can
supplement prison and perhaps reduce the need for it. But because they lack
the bite of condemnation and pain, they send too soft a message, overlooking
the wrong and trying to hurry by it too fast. Criminals need to atone, to be
humbled, to suffer. If they do not, the criminal does not learn a lesson and
victims and the public never see justice done, leaving them dissatisfied. 167
If states viewed harsh death row conditions as just retribution, they
nonetheless might limit the prisoners' isolation to encourage restoration and
reconciliation. States might permit death row inmates, for example, to meet
with the families of their victims to express remorse (something not
contemplated under many current visitation policies). Or states might permit
death row inmates to join in work programs only if they agreed to have their
compensation sent to the families of their victims. In other words, a retributive
vision of death row need not reflect the monolithic harshness of the permanent
punitive segregation that Blecker proposes.
Retributive theory surfaces in other academic and judicial discourse about
68
death row conditions.s
Even when speaking of security rationales for death
row conditions, courts sometimes advert to the moral desert of capital inmates.
For example, Justice Clarence Thomas has written:
Justice [John Paul] Stevens criticizes the "dehumanizing effects" of the
manner in which [the death row prisoner] has been confined, but he never
pauses to consider whether there is a legitimate penological reason for
keeping certain inmates in restrictive confinement....

Justice Stevens altogether refuses to take into consideration the
gruesome nature of the crimes that legitimately lead States to authorize the
death penalty and juries to impose it....

1 67 Id.

168See, e.g., Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1966) (justifying death
row conditions as acceptable by noting that "a death row inmate, is [not] entitled to the
same privileges as the ordinary prisoner" (emphasis added)). Such acknowledgement of
potential retributive purposes for death row may reflect that most people view capital
punishment itself as justified on retributive principles. See BOHM, supra note 10, at 303
(recounting a 2008 public opinion survey in which 54.6% of respondents chose retribution
as the main reason for supporting capital punishment).
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... It is the crime-and not the punishment imposed by the jury or the
delay in petitioner's execution-that was "unacceptably cruel." 1 69
Like Blecker, Justice Thomas invokes the death row inmate's capital
crime in his evaluation of the justice of harsh death row conditions. In a recent
case, he responded to concerns that a death-sentenced prisoner had been held
for decades in solitary confinement by noting that the prisoner's
"accommodations .. . are a far sight more spacious than those in which his
victims .. . now rest." 170 The idea that retributive justice supports harsh death
row conditions has appeared in lower court decisions as well, such as an
opinion regarding death row in Pennsylvania in which the Third Circuit stated:
"[W]e cannot conclude that the totality of the conditions on Pennsylvania's
death rows constitute punishment 'grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the crime[s]."'"71
But not all would agree that retribution justifies harsh confinement on
death row. Russell Christopher contends that substantial death row
incarceration may render the full experience of punishment retributively
excessive. 172 If one defends the death penalty on retribution grounds, he
argues, one sees the death penalty as proportional to at least some capital
crimes. 173 Death row incarceration then adds punishment and renders the
death penalty disproportionately harsh under a retributive calculus. 174
169

Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1118-19 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citation omitted); see also id at 1115 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) ("As
he awaits execution, petitioner has endured especially severe conditions of confinement,
spending up to 23 hours per day in isolation in a 6- by 9-foot cell. Two death warrants have
been signed against him and stayed only shortly before he was scheduled to be put to
death. The dehumanizing effects of such treatment are undeniable.").
1 70 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
171 Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1033 (3d Cir. 1988) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
172
Russell L. Christopher, Death Delayed Is Retribution Denied, 99 MINN. L. REV.
421, 483 (2014) ("[When c]onstruing substantial death row incarceration as additional
punishment . .. the combination of it and death by execution is disproportional, undeserved
and unjustified.").
173 Id at 463.
174
Christopher argues that if, in the alternative, death row is viewed as mitigation of
the penalty of death (through continued life), then it is retributively too weak. Id Again
alternatively, if death row is viewed as "nothing"-neither punishment nor mitigation of
punishment-then it leads to an "absurdity" because then persons who die of natural causes
on death row receive "no punishment at all." Id. at 469-71. Neither of these arguments
seems persuasive. If death row mitigates punishment, this result may be accepted because
justice requires greater concern for avoiding excessive punishment-through lengthy
judicial review designed to determine whether prisoners have been sentenced in errorthan with avoiding improper mitigation of punishment. And the fact that some prisoners
will die of natural causes on death row does not illuminate an "absurd" result but merely
shows that retributive justice is sometimes impossible. It is similarly impossible to achieve
full justice when a prisoner sentenced to fifty years in prison dies in prison after two years
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But Christopher's argument that death row incarceration is inconsistent
with retributive justice appears to assume that execution is the maximum
punishment a retributivist would consider appropriate for capital murder. That
seems far from clear, at least for some of the most egregious capital murders
such as the ones that Blecker describes.' 7 5 If some capital crimes-and only
some-are severe enough to justify harsh death row conditions as well as
execution, such additional punishment could be limited to offenders who have
committed very aggravated capital murders (based on jury findings of specific
aggravation). Limiting harsh death row conditions in this manner might be a
way to calibrate retributive punishment to fit a range of capital crimes.
Retributive justifications for harsh death row conditions would still raise a
significant concern, however. The problem lies in the extraordinarily high
rates of capital sentencing error. As mentioned above, yearly capital
punishment statistics provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics show that
over forty percent of inmates sentenced to death have been removed from
death row. 176 For inmates who are exonerated or resentenced to life or to a
lesser term, the additional suffering caused by harsh death row conditions
would be unjust.1 77
The problem of unjust suffering by persons improperly sent to death row
might be reduced by selective abolition of capital punishment for crimes that
do not involve the highest degree of culpability (eliminating felony murder, for
example, as even Blecker would do) or by allowing death sentences only if a
jury has found several aggravating factors. One study of sentencing error
revealed that for each additional aggravating factor found by a jury, the
likelihood that the capital sentence would be reversed decreased by fifteen
percent.' 7 8 If this measure is correct, then sentencing error could be reduced if
prosecutors proved to a capital jury a higher number of aggravating factors
or when a prisoner sentenced to prison escapes before he can be confined. These events
simply do not call into question the retributive justice of the penalty imposed by law.
1 75 See BLECKER, supra note 26, at 76-77, 99, 110-11. Moreover, there is a larger
retributive problem in imposing the same capital penalty for a wide range of offenses, from
felony murder (where even Blecker agrees it punishes too much) to premeditated firstdegree murder. The Supreme Court held capital punishment for felony murder
constitutional in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
1 76 See SNELL, supra note 9, at 19 tbl.16; see also Gross, O'Brien, Hu & Kennedy,
supra note 11, at 7230.
177 This problem. of unjust suffering exists in other cases of sentencing error, but
statistics suggest that capital sentencing error is particularly high. See infra note 193 and
accompanying text.
The potential retributive problem with harsh death row conditions raised by capital
sentencing error might not arise for prisoners removed from death row for reasons such as
mercy-based commutations or lack of resources to retry defendants who receive appellate
or habeas relief.
1 7 8 JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN, ANDREW GELMAN, VALERIE WEST, GARTH
DAVIES & ALEXANDER Kiss, A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART 1I: WHY THERE IS So MUCH ERROR
IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 333-34 (Feb. 2002),

http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/26AC-43AM].
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(and no longer pursued the death penalty if the jury found only a low number
of aggravating factors).
Perhaps another way to reduce the potential injustice of harsh death row
conditions would be to impose them only after a death sentence has been
upheld on state appellate and collateral review. According to the study by
Liebman, Fagan, and West, most sentencing error is discovered during state
court review. 179 The risk of unjust punishment through harsh death row
conditions thus could be mitigated by waiting until the end of state court
review to send death-sentenced inmates to death row. But because the federal
courts also find sentencing error, 180 further mitigation of the problem of
unjustly harsh death row conditions would require states to wait until both
state and federal courts complete their review. Then, though later investigation
still might find evidence of actual innocence, the risk of unjust placement on
death row would be low.
Unless some such solution can be found, however, the high incidence of
capital sentencing error presents a profound challenge to the justice of harsh
death row conditions imposed on retributive grounds. Retributive theory thus
continues to provide arguments not only for and against the death penalty 8
but also for and against death row.
D. Is Death Row Necessary to Deter Othersfrom Crime?182

Those who do not believe that retributive justice by itself requires harsh
death row conditions nonetheless might find that general deterrence
necessitates such conditions (within the bounds permitted by just

1 79

LIEBMAN, FAGAN & WEST, supra note 144, at i.
FRED L. CHEESMAN 11 & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL
TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 10 (Aug. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
180

See id.; see also NANCY J. KING,

pdffilesl/nij/grants/219558.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ2A-Q544].
181 Public opinion suggests strong support for the death penalty as such in terms of
retributive justice. See Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-

Penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/A8KR-P59W] [hereinafter GALLUP Death Penalty]. This
view also reflects the state of the law, but not the opinion of this author.
182
Death row arguably also might serve a specific deterrence purpose, but not if death
row confinement is permanent, as it is today. See supra note 115. Using death row for
specific deterrence (to discourage the death row inmate from killing again) differs from
using death row for purposes of incapacitation (to prevent the inmate from such violence,
see supra Part 11l.A).
To be specifically deterred by the harshness of death row conditions, the prisoner
would have to be removed from death row so as to fear being returned there. Perhaps
specific deterrence could be achieved by placing all death-sentenced prisoners on death
row for an initial period of time and subsequently only if they kill again. This arrangement

would give them firsthand experience of the hardship of death row and a likely desire to
avoid it.
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retribution1 83). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that states may
impose harsh death row conditions for a deterrent as well as retributive
purpose. In 1890, the Supreme Court described a law requiring solitary
confinement of death-sentenced inmates as imposing "an additional
punishment of the most important and painful character" that was designed "to
mark [the prisoners]as examples of the just punishment of the worst crimes of
the human race." 1 84
To be sure, deterrence may no longer motivate strongly most proponents
of capital punishment and might not influence their approach to death row.
The latest Gallup poll showed that only six percent of Americans stated that
they supported the death penalty on deterrence grounds, when supporters were
85
The poll also showed that
given a list of grounds from which to choose.s
roughly half as many people today believe the death penalty deters as people
did in 1985.186 Some research suggests that the death penalty in fact does not
deter,1 87 but these findings are controverted by other studies. 188

Such temporary harsh confinement would be very different from death row today, which is
permanent. Its potential benefits seem limited. Much of the deterrence effect of temporary
death row confinement might be achieved through the threat of disciplinary segregation,
which prisoners routinely face. Moreover, temporary death row presents the same
overbreadth problem as permanent death row, see supra Part III.A (citing evidence that not
all death-sentenced prisoners require heightened security), though the unnecessary harm
would be imposed for a shorter duration.
18 3

See, e.g., KATE STrrH & JOsE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING

GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 22 (1998) ("One widely shared understanding is that
even if deterrence of crime is the general aim of a system of criminal prohibitions, 'just
desert' (or retribution) should be a limit on the distribution of punishment.").
1841n re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 169-71 (1890) (emphasis added); cf Coleman v.
Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that "the deterrent
value of incarceration during that period of uncertainty may well be comparable to the
consequences of the ultimate step itself").
185
See GALLUP Death Penalty, supra note 181. Most respondents apparently chose
only one ground, although the choice of more than one was not forbidden. See id
186 Id
18 7
See, e.g, John J. Donahue, III & Justin Wolfers, Estimatingthe Impact of the Death
Penalty on Murder, II AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249, 249 (2009) (noting that "[t]here is little
clarity about the knowledge potential murderers have concerning the risk of execution,"
such as whether they tend to be aware of the passage or the existence of a death penalty
statute). Robert Bohm offers an elegant summary of some of the assumptions and problems
of the deterrence rationale for capital punishment. See BOHiM, supra note 10, at 164-65. He
also outlines studies that have suggested a counter-deterrent, or "brutalizing," effect that if
true would mean that capital punishment increases the likelihood of murders. See id at
166-67.
188
See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2748 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining
that "[i]t seems very likely" that the death penalty has a significant deterrent effect, and
citing "statistical studies that say so"). The interesting analysis of one empirical scholar
suggests that in some states, executions deter, whereas in other states, executions may
actually lead to higher rates of murder. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus
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Perhaps deterrence rationales no longer influence many death penalty
supporters because so few persons who commit capital crimes are actually
executed.1 89 But even if execution is improbable,1 90 the de facto punishment
of death row is not. 19 1 Making life on death row much worse than life in the
general prison population might help deter others from capital crime.
Predicting a deterrent effect is difficult, and depends on evidence about
whether potential criminals know what crimes carry the death penalty and
whether they will weigh rationally the costs and benefits. 192 But it seems at
least plausible to think that harsh prison conditions might have some marginal
deterrent effect.
Whether achieving such marginal deterrence would justify imposing harsh
death row conditions on all death-sentenced prisoners raises a different
question and a potential problem. Reversal rates in capital cases are
exceptionally high.1 93 For those prisoners sentenced to death in error, death
row incarceration augments their improperly imposed punishment. Deterrence
objectives thus may bolster the argument for harsh death row conditions, but
only if one accepts, as a normative matter, the risk of unjust additional harm to
prisoners improperly sentenced to death.

The foregoing discussion of punishment purposes for death row reveals
that retaining death row requires normative choices. The administrative
rationale for death row, grounded in claims that death-sentenced inmates are
Brutalization: CapitalPunishment's Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MIcH. L. REV.

(2005).
203,205
1 89 See supra note 11 (recounting evidence that few inmates are executed).
190 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (noting only a
"remote possibility of death" for prisoners sentenced to death in California (emphasis
omitted)), rev'dsub nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
191 Liebman, Fagan, and West's study showed that most death sentences are
overturned, though not always quickly. Indeed, their study showed that after state courts
had completed their layers of review, federal courts went on to find prejudicial error in
over 40% of the remaining death sentences. See LIEBMAN, FAGAN & WEST, supranote 144,
at i (noting that state courts found prejudicial error in 47% of death sentences, while later
federal review found such error in 40% of the remaining sentences); see also supra note
144 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., BOHM, supra note 10, at 164-65; Donahue & Wolfers, supra note 187, at
262-64.
193 The rates at which habeas corpus petitions are granted offers a useful comparison.
See KING, CHEESMAN & OSTROM, supra note 180, at 10 (recounting that the rate at which
petitions are granted in capital cases is thirty-five times higher than the rate in noncapital
cases). The reasons for this error are unclear. Perhaps, when the crimes at issue are
especially heinous and the death penalty is pursued, public outcry and the calls of the
victims' families may lead the jury and judge to push aside doubts to find someone to
blame. Another reason might be that reviewing courts scrutinize more closely possible
errors that might lead to the irreversible consequence of execution.
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categorically more dangerous, has been undercut by empirical studies,
particularly the study of Missouri's abolition of death row. Retaining death
row is not a necessity for security reasons. The fact that some death-sentenced
prisoners are exceptionally dangerous does not require that all death-sentenced
prisoners endure the harshness of permanent isolation. Missouri's experience
has shown that individual assessments can be used to determine the
appropriate custody level for death-sentenced prisoners, as is done with other,
noncapital prisoners.
Death row still might be seen to serve other punishment purposes,
however. Retribution and deterrence aims offer potential reasons to retain
harsh death row conditions,1 94 and perhaps to make them more severe. Some
advocates of harsh punishment might favor punitive death row conditions, as
Robert Blecker does.1 95 Others might believe that capital offenders deserve
less harsh conditions than Blecker proposes, but still harsher conditions than
noncapital prisoners experience. Still others might believe that juries should be
authorized to decide whether certain particularly heinous murderers deserve
the additional punishment of death row-serial killers, perhaps, but not felony
murderers.
Ultimately, the decision whether to retain death row requires judgments
about the purposes of punishment and how much potentially undeserved
suffering society should inflict in the interest of punishment objectives. The
next Part of this Article will contend that these normative judgments should be
made by legislatures rather than prison administrators.
IV. RE-ALLOCATING DECISIONAL POWER OVER DEATH Row

An increasing body of evidence has undercut the dangerousness rationale
for death row and revealed that many if not most death-sentenced inmates do
not require such strict confinement. A dangerousness rationale is no longer
sufficient to justify augmenting punishment in such a categorical, severe, and
permanent way. Thus retaining death row today requires an additional
judgment that confining death-sentenced prisoners more harshly than other
prisoners serves a valid retributive or deterrent purpose.
This Part will show that only legislatures, not prison administrators, are
competent to make that judgment. For legislatures alone have the power to
prescribe punishment for crimes in a way that has democratic legitimacy,
adheres to the constitutional separation of powers, and satisfies the principle of
legality. And legislatures ought not to delegate that power to prison
administrators, even if a delegation were permitted, because prison
administrators might retain death row for illegitimate psychological reasons.
194 As described above, rehabilitation offers little or no basis for isolation of death-

sentenced prisoners for years and decades, as is common practice today. See supra Part
III.B.9 5
1 See supra notes 149-158 and accompanying text.
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A. The Legislative Responsibilityfor Just Punishment
The preceding Part revealed why only punishment purposes of retribution
or deterrence can justify death row. Both of these aims, this Part now will
explain, may be chosen only by the legislature.
1. Retributive and DeterrentRationales
If death row is to be retained for purposes of retribution-either for all
capital offenders or for some-a legislative choice is needed to authorize that
additional punishment. Retributive justifications for punishment are evaluated
more properly by the legislature than by prison administrators, for they entail
questions of proportionality and desert that do not admit of empirically correct
or provable answers-choices about how wrong an action is and how much
suffering a human being should be forced to endure. The decision whether to
treat death-sentenced inmates categorically more harshly than other inmates is
a moral choice more rightly made by the political body most tied to the people
whose normative judgments are embodied in the criminal law. 196
Without a legislative decision, it would be inappropriate for sentencing
authorities, as well as for prison administrators, to impose death row based on
notions of desert. To prescribe death row for punitive reasons without prior
statutory authorization would violate the principle of legality and its
instantiations in the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses. 197
A deterrence rationale for death row likewise requires legislative approval.
In part, that is because punishment for deterrence reasons may be understood
to require an initial determination that such punishment is deserved, or
retributively just.1 98 Legislatures must make that determination. Furthermore,
with regard to the empirical question of which punishments effectively deter,
legislatures remain the proper decision-makers, at least as compared to certain
other institutional actors. The Supreme Court has stated that,

196 Similar arguments have been made in favor of political answers to, inter alia, the
immigration question. See Andrds Snaider, The Politics and Tension in DelegatingPlenary
Power: The Need To Revive Nondelegation Principlesin the Field of Immigration, 6 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 107, 125-26 (1992).
197 The principle of notice can be seen as an aspect of the broader "principle of
legality" that grounds American and European criminal law. See infra notes 209-213 and
accompanying text. Note that an administrative imposition of punishment might not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause if courts were to construe the administratively imposed sanction
not to constitute a "law." It would be troubling, however, for legislatures to be able to
evade the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws through delegations of
punishment authority to administrative actors. And legislatures should not be allowed to
evade notice or legality principles through vaguely worded or merely implicit delegations
of authority to administrators to impose punishments-such as those that now grant prison
administrators decisional power over death row.
19 8

See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 183, at 22.
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The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex
factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures,
which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the
courts.

199

Though the Supreme Court then was comparing legislative competence
with judicial competence regarding the deterrence question, its explanation
bolsters the argument for legislative choice insofar as it points to multi-party
legislative hearing and debate mechanisms as best suited to deal with a
"complex factual issue." 2 00
Various schools of thought support reliance on the legislature for such
disputed normative decisions. Legal process theorists have defended the
efficacy and propriety of legislative determinations. Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks described the legislative process as the "forge and anvil of major public
policy," noting that some problems "have to come [to the legislature] because
they cut so deep into the vital concems of people that no other official agency
has the toughness and resiliency to hammer out solutions which will command
acceptance." 20 1 Jeremy Waldron has presented an argument for legislative
decision-making derived from Aristotelian theory and centered on the
"doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude." 202 Waldron describes the doctrine
in its weak form as follows: "The people acting as a body are capable of
making better decisions, by pooling their knowledge, experience, and insight,
than any individual member of the body, however excellent, is capable of
making on his own." 203 He then states the claim in its strong form: "The
people acting as a body are capable of making better decisions, by pooling
their knowledge, experience, and insight, than any subset of the people acting
as a body and pooling the knowledge, experience, and insight of the members
of the subset." 204 These theories help explain why a legislative decision is so
important and appropriate in the death row context, where the choice involves
unsettled (and highly controversial) normative and empirical claims about the
purposes and effects of punishment.
In some states, the law simply may not allow death row without express
statutory authorization. Numerous state courts have ruled that "the power to
create crimes and punishments . . . inheres solely in the democratic processes

199
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976).
200
Id; see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 700 (William N. Eskridge, Jr.

& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
20 1
Id Hart and Sacks also noted "the durability of public policies and principles of
which have been developed by the process of full-fledged, hard-fought
action
social
legislative
and
public debate." Id at 701.
2 02
JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 93 (1999).

203 Id at 93-94.
204 Id at 94.
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of the legislative branch." 205 Some have explained that the "authority to define
crimes and fix the punishment therefor is vested exclusively in the legislature,
20 6
and it may not delegate that power either expressly or by implication."
The legislature's monopoly on the power to prescribe punishment reflects
a principle undergirding the legal system-"the principle nullapoena sine lege

205 Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. 1991) (citing Borges v. State, 415 So.
2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 1982)) (stating that "the power to create crimes and punishments in
derogation of the common law inheres solely in the democratic processes of the legislative
branch"); see also People v. Mikhail, 13 Cal. App. 4th 846, 854 (1993) ("[T]he legislative
branch bears the sole responsibility and power to define criminal charges and to prescribe
punishment. . . ."); State v. Sequeira, 995 P.2d 335, 337 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000) ("[A] court
may only pronounce a sentence 'which the law hath annexed to the crime[,]' and 'a
sentence which does not conform to statutory sentencing provisions, either in the character
or the extent of the punishment imposed, is void."' (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (first quoting Territory v. Armstrong, 22 Haw. 526, 535 (1915), which in turn
quotes Blackstone; and then quoting 21A AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE § 825, at 88 (2d ed.
1998))); Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d 774, 781 (Miss. 1974) ("We hold that the authority to
define crimes and fix the punishment . . . is vested exclusively in the legislature .... .");
Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 104 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Neb. 1960) ("The public .. . may
properly assume that crimes and punishment are purely a legislative function and that the
definition of all crimes and the punishment therefor will be found in the duly enacted
statutes of this state."); State v. Krego, 433 N.E.2d 1298, 1299 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 198 1)
("[Tlhe authority to define crimes and fix the punishment therefor is vested exclusively in
the legislature .... ).
Deborah Denno has written on impermissible delegation of punishment power in the
capital punishment context, focusing on whether legislatures improperly delegate the
choice of method of execution. See Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate
Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection
and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 100 (2002) ("Of particular interest in this
article are challenges concerning the extent to which a state can delegate to prison
personnel the discretion and power to punish, a problem of greater relevance in lethal
injection cases."); id at 66 ("Legislatures delegate death to prison personnel and
executioners who are not qualified to devise a lethal injection protocol, much less carry one
out.... In their all-consuming haste to perpetuate the death penalty, legislatures and courts
promote an uncontrolled brutality that should have no place in society or the law."
(footnote omitted)).
2 06
Krego, 433 N.E.2d at 1299; Howell, 300 So. 2d at 781 (same); Lincoln Dairy Co.,
104 N.W.2d at 232 ("The Legislature may not avoid by delegation the performance of its
exclusive function to define crimes and provide the punishment therefor."). State court
decisions differ, however, on the degree of separation required among the branches. Some
have ruled, for example, that the legislature may leave certain decisions regarding the way
punishment is imposed to the executive branch. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reed v. Howard, 69
N.E.2d 172, 172 (Ind. 1946) ("The place of punishment of convicts is within the control of
the legislature designation of which it may delegate to other agencies."); Ex parte Granviel,
561 S.W.2d 503, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (allowing the legislature to
delegate to the Director of the Department of Corrections the "power to determine details
so as to carry out the legislative purpose which the Legislature cannot practically or
efficiently perform itself"). These decisions do not suggest that the legislature may delegate
power to increase punishment.
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[no punishment without a prior statutory prohibition]." 2 07 Herbert Packer
described the principle of prior definition of crime and punishment as one that
has been treated as "[tihe first principle" of American criminal law. 2 08 Under
this principle of legality, "the legislature is the principal lawmaker in a modem
system of criminal law." 209
This principle of legality has led courts to prevent prosecution and
punishment from extending beyond the clear reach of statutory authorizations
through the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the doctrine requiring strict
construction of penal statutes (the rule of lenity). 2 10 The prohibition against ex

post facto lawmaking embodies the same idea.2 11 According to the Supreme
Court, "[t]he fair warning requirement. . . reflects the deference due to the
legislature, which possesses the power to define crimes and their
punishment."2 12 Furthermore, the Court has explained:
207 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 48 (1998) (alteration in

original).
208

HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968) ("The

first principle [of the criminal law], we are repeatedly told, is that conduct may not be
treated as criminal unless it has been so defined by an authority having the institutional
competence to do so before it has taken place."); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P.
GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 92 (6th ed. 2012) ("The American

legal system espouses the principle nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, or 'no
crime without law, no punishment without law.' . . . There are three interrelated
corollaries .... First, criminal statutes should be understandable .... Second, criminal
statutes should be crafted so that they do not 'delegate[] basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.' Third, judicial
interpretation of ambiguous statutes should 'be biased in favor of the accused,' a concept
that has come to be known as the lenity doctrine." (fourth alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972))).
209 PACKER, supra note 208, at 91-92. Because this Article focuses on statutory
authorization of death row and administrative imposition of death row, it does not address
whether the principle of legality is offended by common law crimes and punishments.
Some might argue that it does. George Fletcher, for example, contends that the Model
Penal Code's acceptance of punishment for omissions based on common law duties to act
"raises serious problems under the principle [of legality]." FLETCHER, supra note 207, at
47-48. But whether the principle of legality has been modified in the United States to
allow for punishment based on common law as well as statute is not relevant to the analysis
here, where death row is established either by statute or administrative rule.
210 PACKER, supra note 208, at 93. In some jurisdictions, the principle of legality is
codified. See, e.g, Pueblo v. Lucret Quifiones, 11 P.R. Offic. Trans. 904, 931 n.79 (P.R.
1981) ("The principle of legality provides that ' . . . no punishments or security measures
shall be imposed if not previously established [by law]' [and] '[n]o crimes, penalties or
security measures may be created by analogy."' (last alteration in original) (quoting P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 3031)).
211 PACKER, supranote 208, at 80.
212 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 n.5 (1997) (emphasis added) (first citing
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); then citing United States v.
Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995); then citing PACKER, supra note 208, at 79-96; and then
citing John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189 (1985)).
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The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is . . founded on the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle
that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department. It is the legislature ... which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment. 2 13
Allowing prison administrators to augment punishment outside the public
lawmaking process could contravene the principle of legality, especially when
the administrative rule-making process fails to give public notice of the
punishment to be imposed. That is the case in those states in which prison
policies need not be issued after public notice and comment or published
publicly. In Virginia, for example, at least one of the prison regulations
governing death row confinement is not available to the public on the
Department of Corrections regulations website; when death row in Virginia
was challenged in litigation, the relevant policy was filed under seal.214
Punishment imposed by such hidden means does not satisfy the principle of
legality and constitutional requirements of fair and public notice.
For these reasons, death row may not be retained for punishment reasons
without an express determination by legislatures that such confinement is
appropriate.
2. Defending Legislative Action Against Objections
Two core objections may be made to this call for legislative action. One
lies in an institutional concern regarding the micromanagement of prisons, and
the other lies in a consequentialist fear that legislatures will make death row
even more cruel. But neither of these concerns provides a sufficient
justification for ceding to prison administrators the choice of whether to
establish death row.
a. Prison Micromanagement
The first objection to legislative intervention regarding death row likely
will be that legislatures should not become enmeshed in matters of internal
prison discipline. 2 15 As the Supreme Court has recognized, "a prison's internal
213 Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 95.
2 14
See E-mail from Michael Bern, supra note 72.
215 The Supreme Court has required deference to prison officials regarding internal
discipline:
"Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.".. . It does not
insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose, but it
requires that neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials
who have made a considered choice.
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security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison
administrators." 2 16 Prison administrators, not courts or legislators, have
institutional expertise with regard to inmate discipline and institutional
concerns. Yet if legislatures alone possess authority to establish death row
because it is based only on the sentence imposed, it might appear that
legislatures must review all other prison decisions that involve sentencing
considerations. In some jurisdictions, for example, prison administrators
assign initial custody levels based on expected years in prison, as well as other
factors. 217 If death row is seen to augment punishment, arguably these
decisions, too, would need to be reviewed. This objection would reflect a
legitimate reluctance to intrude upon prison decisions that can be based on
administrators' experience and expertise.
However, legislatures already do make decisions regarding prison policy.
The Virginia legislature, for example, has required prison administrators to
give prisoners "appropriate program assignments including career and
technical education, work activities and employment, academic activities .. .,
counseling, alcohol and substance abuse treatment, and such related activities
as may be necessary to assist prisoners in the successful transition to free
society and gainful employment." 2 18 The legislature has specified the average
number of program hours each prisoner should receive, with the number
increasing a specified amount over a period of several years. 2 19 A statute
stating whether death row is appropriate would not require more interference.
Death row placement differs in important ways, moreover, from other
decisions made by prison administrators. Three features typically set death
row apart. First, death row is categorical.The entire class of death-sentenced
prisoners is segregated and isolated. Other prisoners, in contrast, typically
receive individual evaluations to determine their custody placement, either
upon entry into prison or periodically thereafter. 220 This purely sentencedWhitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986) (first alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
2161d at 321 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 337, 349 n.14 (1981)).
2 17

See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT

No. P5100.08, at ch. 5, p. 5 (2006), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100-008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3NGT-8RP4] (providing general rules for security designations based,
inter alia, on remaining sentence length, but permitting deviations to lesser security based
on other circumstances, such as "positive adjustment" to prison life); VA. DEP'T OF CORR.,
INSTITUTIONS BY SECURITY LEVELS, http://vadoc.virginia.gov/facilities/security-levels.shtm
[https://perma.cc/PGA6-DWQP] (indicating that prisoners' sentences affect their security
and location assignments but that prisoners who do not engage in disruptive behavior may
be eligible for transfers to less secure facilities).
2 18
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-32.1(A) (2013).
2 19
See id. § 53.1-32.1(C)(1)-(5).
220 Research for this Article has unearthed no exception to this rule. Even where prison
policies take sentences into account in determining custody placements, placements may be
overridden based on other considerations and are subject to reassessment in light of
institutional behavior. See, e.g., TEX. DEP'T OF CRIM. JUST., OFFENDER ORIENTATION
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based aspect of death row gives it its presumptively punitive character.
Second, death row is permanent. Death-sentenced prisoners remain on death
row until they die or are found to have been sentenced in error; other
prisoners, in contrast, may request and receive custody transfers based on good
behavior. 22 1 The permanence of death row indicates that prison administrators
are not establishing death row based on expert decisions that reflect their
unique view into prisoners' behavior and administrative needs. And third,
death row is severely harsh. The severity of death row conditions makes them
significant and of urgent concern. 222 In many states death row means solitary
confinement, perhaps the harshest prison condition possible, and far worse
than normal maximum security conditions. 223 Solitary confinement otherwise

5
(2015), http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/Offender Orientation
HandbookEnglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TSE-76WU] ("An offender's custody level
depends on his current institutional behavior, his previous institutional behavior, and his
current offense and sentence length. If the offender violates any rules, he may be placed in
a more restrictive custody. If the offender complies with the rules, he may be assigned a
less restrictive custody level."); VA. DEP'T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE 830.5(111)
HANDBOOK

[https://
(2014),
http://vadoc.virginia.gov/About/procedures/documents/800/830-5.pdf
perma.cc/G73G-SNU8] (providing for an annual review of each offender's classification
based on "an offender's needs and objectives" and permitting general population
offenders-but not death row inmates-to request facility transfer).
Death row prisoners automatically face some of the strictest forms of incarceration,
without the individualized procedural review other prisoners receive. Arkansas's practice
of confining death-sentenced prisoners in supermax provides an example. Noncapital
prisoners may not be sent to Arkansas's supermax unit unless they have escaped from a
prior facility, assaulted another inmate or staff, been convicted of violent felony in prison,
or for "[o]ther reasons, which the Warden believes may constitute a serious threat to the
security and good order of the institution." ARK. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE HANDBOOK 34
(2012), http://adc.arkansas.gov/resources/Documents/Inmate%20Handbook%202012%20%20single%20page.pdf [https://perna.cc/MZV6-V9Q4]. To be transferred, moreover, an
Arkansas prisoner first must receive a hearing and opportunity to call witnesses and
introduce evidence to challenge the grounds for transfer. Id. Death-sentenced prisoners, in
contrast, receive no such protections. Since 2003, they have been placed directly in the
supermax facility. See Associated Press, Death Row on the Move, KAIT8 (Aug. 26, 2003),
http://www.kait8.com/Global/story.asp?S=1417128 [https://perma.cc/W2LN-FKYR].They
must live in supermax confinement although, according to the prison system's
spokeswoman, "[t]he death row inmates are the best behaved inmates in prison." DeathRow Cells Are Unlocked by Accident, supra note 96 (quoting Dina Tyler, spokeswoman for
the Arkansas
prison system).
221
See supra note 220.
222 Recently, a great deal of attention has been focused on the solitary confinement of
prisoners, precisely because of the significant harms that follow from such treatment. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
223 As an example, consider the contrast between Virginia's solitary confinement of
death row prisoners, see supra note 4, and the conditions of general population prisoners at
the same maximum security facility (Sussex I State Prison). The district court explained in
Prietov. Clarke:
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is reserved as a temporary measure to punish inmates who violate prison rules,
are found individually to pose special risks, or sometimes as an extreme and
unfortunate measure deemed necessary to protect prisoners at special risk.224
In combination, the categorical nature, permanence, and severity of death row
conditions set them apart from all or nearly all other prison conditions. The
need for legislative review of death row does not imply a need for legislatures
to micromanage the many prison conditions that do not implicate these three
crucial factors.
A final consideration also favors legislative action: Without legislative
action, a real risk arises that no one will make a reasoned and deliberate
decision about whether death row is necessary. Though prison administrators
actually are choosing to establish death row, they-like so many courts and
scholars-may assume that death row is an inevitable consequence of the
decision of sentencing authorities to impose the death penalty. Meanwhile,
sentencing authorities may assume that prison administrators are maintaining
death row based on their institutional expertise and an empirical evaluation of
prisoner risks. Legislatures, too, may make this assumption. But in reality, no
one is making a reasoned or deliberate decision about the need for death row.
Justice Kennedy recently expressed a similar concern. He wrote in a
concurring opinion in a recent capital case: "It seems fair to suggest that, in
decades past, the public may have assumed lawyers and judges were engaged
in a careful assessment of correctional policies, while most lawyers and judges
assumed these matters were for the policymakers and correctional experts." 2 25
He urged close scrutiny over whether the solitary confinement of death-

Conditions for [general population prisoners and death row prisoners] differ in almost
every meaningful respect. First, general population inmates spend substantial time
every day out of the confines of their cells. For example, they are given approximately
80 minutes of outdoor recreation four or five days per week, and they have access to

the open prison yard, complete with a jogging track and basketball courts. Second,
general population inmates enjoy the near-constant company of others... .This is to
say nothing of the benefits of two communal meals per day, regular contact visits
from family and friends, and group religious and educational programming. In other
words, the experience for general population inmates at SISP is hardly a solitary one.
No. 1:12-CV-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013) (citation omitted),
rev'd on other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015).
224See, e.g., VA. DEP'T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE 861.1(V)(A)(100) (2016),
http://vadoc.virginia.gov/About/procedures/documents/800/861-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AKE2-K9SY] (listing prison offenses, including killing another inmate, and providing a
maximum penalty of loss of 30 days good conduct allowance and up to 30 days
disciplinary segregation); VA. DEP'T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE 861.3(IX)(A)(1)
[https://
(2015), http://vadoc.virginia.gov/About/procedures/documents/800/861-3.pdf
perma.cc/H32T-FCK6] (providing for segregation for personal protection or custodial
management).
225 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209-10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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sentenced prisoners and other inmates was necessary, and seemed to invite a
constitutional challenge to the long-term use of solitary confinement. 226
Requiring legislative authorization of death row will ensure that it is not
used illegitimately and unthinkingly to augment the punishment for capital
crimes. 227 As Justice Kennedy observed, "Even if the law were to condone or
permit this added punishment, so stark an outcome ought not to be the result of
society's simple unawareness or indifference." 22 8
b. Legislative Harshness

Another likely objection is that legislatures will mandate even harsher
death row conditions than prison administrators already impose today. Critics
who espouse this objection may care less about a democratically legitimate
process than about a humane result. But the arguments in this Article are nonconsequentialist in nature, 229 and rooted in the idea that the division of
authority among the branches best preserves and legitimates the exercise of
power over a people that does not agree on the existence of some higher law
and has agreed to rely instead on majority will. The arguments are also
grounded in a conception of what state constitutional law requires as a matter
of the separation of powers, and on the principle of legality that could be
violated by the administrative creation of death row.
The consequentialist argument may also be answered on its terms, for the
sake of broadening the discussion. A historical review of laws regarding
methods of execution offers a useful example to show that legislatures-even
23 0
in states that choose to retain capital punishment-are not inevitably harsh.
Over the last decade and a half, state legislatures have pursued less painful
methods of execution out of what the Supreme Court has called "an earnest

226 1d.

(objecting to the use of permanent solitary confinement for death row and

other prisoners).
certain
227

See HART & SACKS, supra note 200, at 696 (describing "the ideals of an informed
and deliberative [legislative] process").
228
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2209.
2 29
See supra notes 197-214 and accompanying text.
230 Over the last one hundred and fifty years, a dozen states abolished the death penalty
in favor of lesser punishments; six states abolished it within the last fifteen years. States
With and Without the Death Penalty as of July 1, 2015, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/8KBYMVU6].
More broadly speaking, Darryl Brown has shown that legislatures over the last
hundred years often have limited dramatically-and sometimes entirely repealed-criminal
laws, usually with strong public support for their decriminalization choices. See Darryl K.
Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization,86 TEX. L. REv. 223, 233-45 (2007). Brown's
research calls explicitly into question the common claim that the politics of crime create a
one-way ratchet in favor of greater criminalization. Id. at 223-25.
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desire to provide for a progressively more humane manner of death." 23 1
Indeed, states adopted electrocution as the method of execution in the late
1880s after a commission established by the New York legislature concluded
that it was "the most humane and practical method known to modern science
of carrying into effect the sentence of death in capital cases." 2 32 The Supreme
Court observed that they had done so because of "a well-grounded belief that
electrocution is less painful and more humane than hanging." 233 Lethal gas
was adopted in numerous states after the Nevada legislature concluded that it
was "the most humane manner known to modem science" at the time.234
Later, legislatures "once again sought a more humane way to carry out death
sentences [and] eventually adopted lethal injection." 235 In other words,
legislatures do not always enact harsher or crueler laws, even for the most
hated criminals.
Furthermore, legislatures have fiscal reasons to eliminate or limit the use
of death row. Death row segregation and isolation require additional facilities
and resources. 236 Studies have found that housing a prisoner on death row
costs tens of thousands of dollars more per year than housing him in the
general population. One estimate revealed that California pays $90,000 more
to house each condemned prisoner on death row.2 37 For budgetary reasons,
231 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (plurality opinion); see also TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 43.24 (West 2006) ("No torture, or ill treatment, or unnecessary pain, shall
be inflicted upon a prisoner to be executed under the sentence of the law.").
232In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890); see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 42; Malloy v.
South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915).
23 3
Malloy, 237 U.S. at 185.
234
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015) (quoting State v. Jon, 211 P. 676,
682 (Nev. 1923)).
23 5
1d More recently, at least one state legislature has tried to limit the duration of the
time inmates spend on death row. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.055 (West Supp. 2016)
("It is the intent of the Legislature to reduce delays in capital cases and to ensure that all
appeals and postconviction actions in capital cases are resolved within 5 years after the
date a sentence of death is imposed in the circuit court."). Perhaps the legislature's concern
was motivated by a desire to be more humane, or perhaps it sought to promote the
efficiency and efficacy of the death penalty.
23 6
See supranote 32.
23 7
See Alarc6n & Mitchell, supra note 33, at S102-06 (describing $90,000 as best
estimate available for additional costs of death row confinement); see also Ed Barnes, Just
or Not, Cost of Death Penalty Is a Killerfor State Budgets, Fox NEws (Mar. 27, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/03/27/j ust-cost-death-penalty-killer-state-budgets/ [https://
perma.cc/YB3Z-3Y98] (citing $90,000 estimate). Studies also have found that solitary
confinement generally is extremely expensive, and so when death row involves such
isolation, its costs will naturally be much higher. See, e.g., ACLU, A SOLITARY FAILURE:
THE WASTE, COST AND HARM OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN TEXAS 39 (Feb. 2015),

https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/field documents/SolitaryReport 2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RCH4-6M8J] (stating that in Texas solitary confinement "costs forty-five percent
more than housing the same person in general population, or $61.63 per person per day
compared to $42.46 per person per day").
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legislatures might abolish death row or ameliorate costly death row conditions
such as solitary confinement.
Fiscal concerns might motivate a legislature at least to reduce the use of
death row, such as by creating a penal review board-akin to a parole boardwith authority to release a prisoner into the general prison population after a
certain period of time or good behavior. 23 8 Thus, legislatures might abolish or
reduce death row for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways.
Admittedly, some legislatures might be reluctant to eliminate death row,
out of fear of the political blame they would face if any inmate were to escape
or kill again. 239 Legislatures might see the political risk as too high a price to
pay for a less cruel or costly capital punishment process.2 40 But evidence could
be useful to counteract such alarmism. Experts such as Mark Cunningham,
who authored the study of Missouri's death row abolition experience, could
testify that death-sentenced inmates are as a group no more dangerous than
term-sentenced inmates. 24 1 And publicizing cost estimates of death row
confinement could foster public support for death row abolition.
A legislature concerned about political backlash also could appoint a
special commission to study death row confinement and to offer
recommendations. This approach would make it harder for the legislatures to
be accused of making a rash or unreasoned decision. Legislatures appointed
similar commissions before adopting more humane methods of execution. 242
A commission could provide legislatures with analysis and recommendations
regarding the ethical, punishment, and fiscal dimensions of death row. The

238 The author thanks Professor Robert Ferguson for this thoughtful suggestion.

Here one should note that parole decisions do not appear to implicate the problem of
administrative imposition of punishment challenged in this Article. A parole system
requires an express decision by the legislature to allow reductions in punishment based on
subsequent behavior. See, e.g., Rivenbark v. Commonwealth, 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Pa.
1985) ("Parole is a method of rehabilitation enacted as the public policy of the
Commonwealth pursuant to the General Assembly's exclusive power to determine the
penological system of the Commonwealth."). Such a delegation of release power may be
the only means by which legislatures can enact punishment calibrated to the goal of
rehabilitation. Moreover, authorized decreases in punishment do not raise the legality and
separation of powers concerns that flow from the imposition of additional, non-statutory
punishments.
239
If prisoner escapes into the public are the chief concern, strictly monitoring external
prison perimeters might address the problem even if prisoners are granted greater internal
privileges and activities. The extent of external perimeter safeguards helps distinguish
higher security prisons from lower ones. Perimeter security does not equate to close
custody restrictions, though high-security prisons tend to have both. See, e.g., About
Our Facilities, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/federal_
prisons.jsp [https://perma.cc/9EH8-9JZY].
240 Prison administrators, too, may have such fear, suspecting that they will be blamed
for change but not held responsible if they simply maintain the status quo.
241 See supra Part IV.A.
24 2
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731-32 (2015).
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legislature could rely on the commission's recommendations and estimates to
support its own decision regarding death row.
Not only would these approaches limit the risk of unthinking legislative
cruelty, and thus assuage the consequentialist objection to legislative decisionmaking, but they could foster a more reasoned and legitimate lawmaking
process.
B. Executive Officials andExecutioner Bias
The Article has explained why legislatures alone have competence to
establish death row, and that this power may not be delegable. Now the Article
will contend that even if legislatures legally could delegate this power to
prison administrators, they should not do so. The reason is that prison
administrators may not be suited to make fair and informed choices about
whether death row is necessary, because their perspective may be affected by
their dual role in the execution process-as both executioners and
policymakers. 243 The Article will describe this risk as one of possible
"executioner bias." 244
Prison administrators, such as death row wardens and directors of
departments of corrections, often serve two roles in the execution process. 245
As part of their responsibilities under state law, they may be required to play
direct roles in the execution process, by ordering and supervising executions.
According to criminologist Robert Johnson, "The plain fact is that formal
executioners, whether shrouded in secrecy or working more or less as public
figures, do not orchestrate the execution process. The warden or his designate
does." 246 At the same time, these officials are often involved in setting or
243 Other reasons may exist why prison administrators would retain death row, which
this Article does not explore because they do not show why administrators would be worse
decision-makers than legislatures. One of these other reasons is simple risk-aversion. If
officials lessen the restraints imposed on death-sentenced prisoners, and one of the
prisoners kills an inmate or guard, or tries to escape, the prison administrators will be
blamed for not keeping the prisoners in harsher conditions. This agency problem will give
administrators an incentive to maintain the status quo to avoid blame. Legislatures,
however, would face the same incentive not to change.
244 This term is the author's own.
2 45
The prison administrators, who would be involved in the policy decisions regarding
how death-sentenced inmates should be confined, must be distinguished from prison
personnel who lack policy-making power and who may not be involved in the executions
of the inmates they guard.
246
JoHNSON, supra note 137, at 126. Death row wardens are personally involved in the
execution process. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-100(b) (West 2009) ("Besides
the warden or deputy warden and such number of correctional staff as he thinks necessary,
the following persons may be present at the execution: the Commissioner of
Correction...."); CONN. DEP'T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIvE 6.15(9)-(12)
(2014), http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0615.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8CQM2WS] (requiring the warden to supervise personally the execution process, including by
escorting the executioner(s) and witnesses, inspecting the condemned prisoners' physical
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implementing confinement policies for death-sentenced prisoners. 247 As
Johnson explains,
[The execution] process starts on death row, the bleak and oppressive "prison
within a prison" where the condemned are housed for years awaiting
execution ...

and culminates in the deathwatch . . . supervised by a team of

correctional officers ... who typically report directly to the prison warden. 248

Presuming that the death penalty requires death row may make it easier
psychologically for prison administrators to fulfill their lethal roles in the
execution process 249 in at least three ways. First, the segregation and isolation
of death-sentenced inmates helps foster an image of death-sentenced inmates
as uniquely vicious and dangerous. This image makes executions easier to
rationalize on retribution or incapacitation grounds. Second, death row
conditions of segregation and isolation may help break down empathy for
condemned inmates, making it easier to think that their deaths do not matter or
even that they deserve to die. Third, imposing death row automatically and
invariably for each death-sentenced inmate shifts responsibility for the
judgment of the appropriateness of such pre-execution confinement to
sentencing authorities, implying further that death row is part of the just
retribution decided upon by those authorities. In these ways, the existence of

restraints, inspecting the IV connection in the prisoner, and ordering the lethal injection to
be administered). Other states are similar. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(5)
(2015) ("The warden shall ... select the person to perform the execution, and the warden
or the warden's designee shall supervise the execution."); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234
(2013) (requiring that "[a]t the execution there shall be present the Director [of the
Department of Corrections] or an assistant"). The process may take a toll on wardens, as
some have attested. See, e.g, Ron McAndrew, Former Florida Warden Haunted by
Botched Execution, DEATH PENALTY Focus, http://deathpenalty.org/article.php?id=293
[https://perma.cc/UPU5-16] ("During my tenure as Warden at Florida State Prison it was
my duty to oversee the executions of three men: John Earl Bush, John Mills Jr. and Pedro
Medina. Remembering every gruesome detail of their deaths is haunting.").
247 See, e.g., ARK. DEP'T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION AR002(l) (1988),

http://adc.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/AR002.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWB9-UU2Y] ("The
Director shall delegate authority to the Unit Wardens/Center Supervisors/Administrators or
appropriate administrative designees to act on all matters related to the unit/center
operational areas, to manage all programs, activities, inmates, personnel and volunteers
connected with the unit/center/operational areas."); CONN. DEP'T OF CORR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE 1.3(15)(B) (2015), http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/
ad0103.pdf [https://perma.cc/8678-LH9T] (providing for input by units that will be
affected
by policy changes).
24 8
24 9

JOHNSON, supra note 137, at 126.

Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) ("(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable
as a principal.").
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death row may make it easier psychologically for prison administrators to
direct executions.
I. Inmates As Savages
Segregation of inmates on death row reinforces an image of the deathsentenced inmates as dangerous savages. Justice Brennan viewed the denial of
common humanity as an inevitable aspect of capital punishment. Concurring
in Furman v. Georgia, he wrote that "[t]he calculated killing of a human being
by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's
humanity." 2 50 He argued that the death penalty marked the condemned as
categorically different from other prisoners and no longer "member[s] of the
human family." 2 51
Indeed, researchers have found that persons who must assist executions
tend to engage in psychological self-protection by "dehumaniz[ing]" capital
murderers as "devoid of any human qualities." 252 Dehumanization may be
expressed by assertions that, "Murderers who receive the death penalty have
forfeited the right to be considered full human beings." 253
Social and psychological studies have shown that participation in killing
creates enormous psychological stress, even when fully legal. 2 54 Executioners
(and others who must kill, such as soldiers) develop psychological coping
mechanisms that limit their inhibitions and the psychological impact or "moral
injury" caused by their lethal roles. 2 55
Researchers have studied the kinds of coping mechanisms employed by
prison personnel involved in the execution process. In a study published in
2005, Stanford researchers visited three penitentiaries where executions were
carried out, 256 and studied the moral disengagement levels of execution team
members, support team members who consoled the victims' families and the
2 50

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).

251 Id.
2 52
2 53
254

Osofsky, Bandura & Zimbardo, supra note 132, at 380 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
See, e.g., RACHEL M. MACNAIR, PERPETRATION-INDUCED TRAUMATIC STRESS: THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KILLING 31-43
255

(2002).

Jonathan Shay, who studied the phenomenon of "moral injury," writes in a book on
American soldiers in Vietnam that the enemy soldiers were "called madmen and animals
and were said to lack any emotions." JONATHAN SHAY, ACHILLES IN VIETNAM: COMBAT

TRAUMA AND THE UNDOING OF CHARACTER 106 (1994). Saira Mohamed has contributed
important analysis of perpetrator trauma and the tendency of perpetrators of killings to
rationalize their actions. See Saira Mohamed, Of Monsters and Men: PerpetratorTrauma
and Mass Atrocity, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1157, 1185-86 (2015).
2 56
Osofsky, Bandura & Zimbardo, supra note 132, at 377-78. The study focused on
three types of personnel, including support team members and persons directly
participating in the lethal actions. Id. at 371, 378. The study concluded that "[e]xecutioners
made heaviest use of dehumanization, security and economic justifications and disavowal
of personal responsibility, but somewhat lesser use of moral justification." Id. at 382.
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condemned inmates, and prison guards with no involvement in the execution
process. 257 The researchers found that "[t]o negate moral self-sanctions,
executioners do not focus on the taking of life, but rather seek solace in the
dignity of the process and in the view that condemned killers have a bestial
aspect to their nature and executing them will protect the public." 2 58 All three
groups-executioners, supporters, and guards-"dehumanized" the prisoners
to some degree, and the executioners did so the most. 2 59 Building upon earlier
studies, the researchers concluded that "the offenders tend to be dehumanized
by those who have to take a human life." 26 0
The Stanford study illuminated the psychological tendencies of
executioners, and its findings could suggest that prison administrators who
direct executioners also might treat death-sentenced prisoners in ways that
dehumanize them. As Lyon and Cunningham have noted, segregation on death
row labels the death row inmate as a vicious criminal who has committed a
hideous crime for which he must live permanently apart from others, awaiting
execution. 26 1 His segregation and isolation confirm the sense that he is
dangerous, vicious, and unfit for human interaction. 2 62 The isolation,
restriction of personal hygiene, and physical and mental stagnation increases
the sense of death row defendants as bestial and different from human beings
who retain the right to life. Indeed, such treatment may push inmates actually
to become the enemy of humanity that they were first labeled to be. 263
Some prisons may use additional visual markers as well as physical
barriers to set death-sentenced inmates apart. In Florida, for example, death
257
Id
258

at 371.
at 386-87 (emphasis added). The executioners, support group members, and
prison guards sought to avoid moral injury in other ways as well, such as by citing the
"moral, economic, and societal security justifications" for the death penalty. Id at 371,
381, 387.
1d

259Id at 383.
260 Id at 387-88.
261

See Lyon & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that after mainstreaming in

Missouri, "efforts were made to separate from the self-perpetuating mythology of
condemned inmates by modifying the terminology used to refer to these inmates: 'death
JOHNSON, supra note
137, at 218 ("Prisoners on death row are sometimes explicitly referred to as 'dead men."').
262 See, e.g., Michael J. Osofsky & Howard J. Osofsky, The Psychological Experience
of Security Officers Who Work with Executions, 65 PSYCHIATRY 358, 365 (2002) (noting
that some officers who worked with executions justified the death penalty by "[sitressing
the heinous nature of the inmates' crimes [and] referenced some of the horrid acts of
inmates on Death Row"); John L. Worrall & Robert G. Morris, Inmate Custody Levels and
Prison Rule Violations, 91 PRISON J. 131, 148 (2011) (suggesting that imposition of a
custody level "labels" an inmate and stating that the classification of the inmate leads to
assumptions about him).
263 To the extent that death row conditions of segregation and isolation prevent these
inmates from being in contact with other persons and lead to their psychological and
physical dysfunction, they may become a self-fulfilling prophecy that the prisoners will be
unfit to function in society, even the limited society that exists in a prison community.

row inmates' was replaced by 'capital punishment inmates"'); cf
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row inmates are distinguished visibly from other inmates because they must
wear orange t-shirts.2 64 These superficial distinctions serve as a reminder of
the crimes these prisoners have committed, setting them apart from the rest of
humanity and even the prison community.
By adopting death row policies that require the automatic isolation of
prisoners without individual evaluations, prison officials avoid the need for
personal contacts that might cast doubt on their view of these prisoners as
savages, and might reveal their common humanity. By marking deathsentenced inmates as savages who must be segregated and isolated for the
safety of others, prison administrators may find it easier to justify killing them
on incapacitation grounds, or even for reasons of retribution or general
deterrence. Moreover, to the extent the condemned inmates are segregated
from others and unable to contribute to society (even prison society), their
continued existence may seem a waste and their execution may be rationalized
on economic grounds as well.
2. The Destruction ofEmpathy

Death row also may serve to break down empathy and to make executions
easier to perform. Insofar as death row helps prison administrators and
guards 265 dehumanize prisoners as savages, it may limit the officials' empathy
for the prisoners when they suffer. And death row conditions also create a
psychological and apparent divide between prison officials and inmates. As
Craig Haney has shown in his seminal work on the "empathic divide" that
enables white juries to impose death sentences on black defendants, 2 66 racial,
cultural, and situational differences can break down empathy. 26 7
2 64

FLA. Death Row, supra note 46 ("Death Row inmates can be distinguished from
other inmates by their orange t-shirts.").
265 The Article uses the term "prison guards," in reference to prison employees who
interact on a daily basis with prisoners, providing their meals, transportation, and the like.
Though these employees might also be referred to as "correctional officers," the Article
uses the term "prison guards" to avoid confusion between their work and that of "prison
administrators," who have authority to establish overarching rules for the prison and who
may but need not come in contact with prisoners on a daily basis.
26 6
See Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized
Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573 (extending Haney's
prior work on the empathic divide).
267 Sharon Dolovich has argued that "[i]n today's carceral regime,... to be a prisoner
is to occupy a morally degraded state, in which any harm you suffer counts for nothing."
Dolovich, supra note 139, at 312. Given the disproportionate number of blacks who are
convicted of crime, Dolovich has implied that racial animus may be a factor in the
imposition of harsh penal conditions. See id at 313 ("Certainly, the drivers of exclusion
and control are complex, and not reducible to any one variable, be it race or otherwise. But
it surely bears noting that, as segregation based exclusively on race has become
constitutionally impermissible, the carceral system-which allows for both the physical
removal and moral degradation of targeted individuals-has dramatically expanded and
disproportionately targeted people of color."). If death row conditions are made
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Segregation and isolation of death-sentenced inmates may hinder empathy
for the condemned and the shared suffering it could generate. When deathsentenced inmates are prevented from engaging in communal activities,
supervising officials (prison administrators and, more frequently, prison
guards) do not have to see the inmates behaving toward others with generosity,
humor, or friendship. They also avoid seeing the inmates fight with one
another, or display fear of injury at the hands of other inmates-negative
actions and emotions but nonetheless ones that manifest the humanity and
personality of the condemned. Not seeing how death-sentenced inmates
interact with others may make it less likely that prison officials will relate to
them or empathize with them. Limitations on visits between death-sentenced
inmates and their families also may shield officials from witnessing the
prisoners' love for their families and the suffering the families feel as they
anticipate the prisoners' executions. The avoidance of empathy may cultivate a
team of prison officials less troubled by executions and more willing to
participate in the execution process directed by prison administrators.
Some scholars, most notably Sharon Dolovich in recent years, have
written about how our penal system excludes criminals from society and from
the rights that society accords. 268 Death row takes exclusion a step further and
bars death-sentenced inmates even from the general prison community. Over
time, the strictures of death row may deprive inmates of all personal
relationships. For the prohibition on contact visits, and the restrictions on
26 9
visitation generally, eventually may break down even those familial bonds.
The loosening of the prisoner-family bonds may make the families less pained
or angry as a result of the execution process. Prison administrators in turn may
be more accepting of their lethal roles when the execution process does not
appear to cause so much pain to innocent family members.

intentionally harsh as punishment, Dolovich's argument would seem to raise a serious
concern. But the strongest evidence of the harshness of death row conditions-the
argument that they force some inmates to "volunteer" for execution-undercuts a racial
animus claim at least in the context of death row; white inmates "volunteer" at a rate ten
times that of black inmates. See DPIC "Volunteers," supra note 7. This disproportionate
willingness of whites to speed their deaths may reflect many factors, including, perhaps,
their greater incidence of guilt. It does, however, undercut any suggestion that death row
conditions disproportionately burden black inmates.
268 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 139.
269
See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 599 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(recounting expert testimony stating that contact visitation is crucial to retention of
prisoners' familial bonds and that denial of contact visitation contributes to the break-up of
prisoners' marriages); see also Opening Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 126, at 1112 (noting that the current prison warden for Virginia's death row has stated that he would
allow a contact visit by an immediate family member only if a death row inmate were on
his deathbed).
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3. Deflection ofResponsibility
By treating death row as tethered to death sentences, prison administrators
can deny responsibility for the entire execution process, including the
dehumanizing conditions of pre-execution confinement. Death row becomes
an inevitable correlate of a death sentence, and the result of decisions by other
authorities: the legislatures that authorized the capital penalty, the jury and
judge who imposed the capital sentence, and the inmate who committed the
capital offense. The "tether" between death sentences and death row 270
provides cover for prison administrators to distance themselves from the
prisoners they will have to execute. The Stanford study mentioned above
found that all prison personnel involved in executions strongly denied
responsibility for the execution decision. 2 71 They emphasized that they had no
role in imposing the death sentences. 272 As the Stanford researchers observed
with regard to executioners: "Displacement of responsibility absolves
executioners from being judged personally for carrying out the orders of
society, and shifts responsibility to the heinous nature of the crimes and to
sentencing requirements . . . ."273
Arguments in the recent Prieto case illustrate how prison administrators
may seek to shift responsibility to sentencing authorities. During oral
argument in October 2014, the Virginia Director of Corrections argued that the
segregation and solitary confinement of death row prisoners was warranted
because they had been found by the jury or judge to pose a risk of future
dangerousness or to have committed particularly "vile" crimes (and thus
presumably to require either permanent incapacitation or harsh retribution). 2 74
He made clear that death row placement resulted solely and entirely from the
sentence. 2 75 Indeed, he explained, even if the court required the prison to
270 According to the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Prieto v. Clarke, "tethered to
the death sentence in Virginia is pre-execution confinement on death row." 780 F.3d 245,
254 (4th Cir. 2015).
271 Osofsky, Bandura & Zimbardo, supra note 132, at 371, 381, 386-87.
272 Id

273 Id at 379.
2 74
0ral Argument
at 13:40,
Prieto, 780 F.3d 245
(No.
13-8021),
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments#audiocurrent [https://
perma.cc/6C5E-E8UZ] (arguing that death row placement is due to the sentence which is
based on one of two determinations: risk of future dangerousness or that the crime was
particularly "vile"). Note that the required finding is in addition to a finding that the
defendant has committed an enumerated capital crime. See supra note 81; see also Oral
Argument, supra (Motz, J.) (referring to the "death row sentence"); John Woestendiek,
Prison Official Backs Segregation of Death-Row Inmates, PHILLY.COM (June 28, 1986),
http://articles.philly.com/1986-06-28/news/26045740_death-row-inmates-state-prisongraterford [https://perma.cc/9Z5K-VDUK] (quoting official as stating that "our philosophy
is that the sentence overrides the other factors because it's the only sentence that leads to
death").
275 The director's argument, and death row policies of segregation and isolation
generally, thus contradict Robert Blecker's claim that prison officials "consciously ignor[e]
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assess death-sentenced inmates individually for security risk, the prison would
give them an automatic maximum score based on their death sentences that
would secure their placement on death row.276 In other words, the prison
would assume that a capital sentence meant that death row was necessary. This
approach enabled Virginia prison officials to place responsibility for the entire
pre-execution process on the legislature, judge, and jury, for imposing a death
sentence for a capital crime.2 77
In all the foregoing ways, death row segregation and isolation may help
prison administrators reduce the psychological burden of their participation in
executions. Contrary to presumptions that prison administrators will base their
death row policies on institutional competence, prison administrators may be
predisposed to impose conditions that will limit their own "moral injury" and
psychological stress. They may not give up longstanding death row policies,
even in the face of mounting evidence that the segregation of all deathsentenced prisoners is not necessary for security reasons. 2 78 And instead of
judging whether any retributive and deterrent purposes require death row,
prisoners' criminal records" and thus "unwittingly help sever the essential retributive
connection between the past crime committed and the present punishment experienced."
Blecker, supra note 34, at 1171.
276
The prison's approach to noncapital inmates is very different. See VA. OPERATING
PROCEDURE, supra note 70, at 830.2(111) (defining prisoner "suitability" for a particular
custody level as "[a] reasoned, professional judgment regarding an offender's ability to
perform in a certain security level or facility environment; it calls for a discerning
judgment relative to length of sentence, crime, prior record, as well as sociological,
medical, and psychological considerations. Suitability differs with each individual offender
depending upon the offender's facility, parole eligibility, Mandatory Parole Release Date
or Good Time Release Date."); id. at 830.2(lV)(A)(1) (stating that offenders are to be
"assigned to the least restrictive security level necessary and not subjected to excessive
control and management").
2 77
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Prieto fosters this impression that the sentencing
authorities are responsible for confinement conditions. See Prieto, 780 F.3d at 254 (stating
that "tethered to the death sentence in Virginia is pre-execution confinement on death
row").
278

&

Corrections authorities have ready access to this information. See Lyon
Cunningham, supra note 16, at 8 n.44 ("Correction departments belong to common
associations and accrediting organizations, disseminate statistical experience and research
findings with each other, and are guided by common judicial determinations." (quoting
Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Violence Risk Assessment at Federal Capital
Sentencing: Individualization, Generalization, Relevance, and Scientific Standards, 29
CR[M. JUST. & BEHAV. 512, 522 (2002))). Recently, the Association of State Corrections
Administrators released a thorough study and critique of the widespread use of solitary
confinement, including for death row prisoners. See ASCA-LIMAN SURVEY, supra note 13;
Williams, supra note 13.
Notably, former corrections officials recently spoke out in an amicus brief against the
use of solitary confinement for death-sentenced prisoners. See Brief of Amici Curiae
Correctional Experts in Support of Appellee, supra note 54, at 1-3. But they did so only
after ceasing to serve in lethal roles. Id (describing past experience with death-sentenced
prisoners).
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prison administrators may hold onto death row in order to reassure themselves
that these and other purposes require execution.
C. The Role of the Courts
This Article thus far has focused on the role of legislatures and prison
administrators regarding death row. Challenging the existing reliance on
administrative decision-making has been its central aim. Now the Article will
turn to the role that courts may play in ensuring that the allocation of
decisional authority remains within constitutional bounds.
Prior scholars and courts have explored important limits on the harshness
of death row imposed by the Eighth Amendment, 2 79 the Due Process
Clause, 280 and international law. 2 8 1 They have entirely overlooked, however,
279 Some of the most significant challenges to death row conditions have been raised
under the Eighth Amendment. Andrea Lyon and Mark Cunningham have argued that
automatic and permanent isolation on death row violates the Eighth Amendment because it
is unnecessary and cruel. See Lyon & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 13 ("[Tlhe long-term
segregation and deprivations of death row have been shown time and time again to have
deleterious and even debilitating effects upon inmates, thereby rendering death row cruel.
Because the stark conditions of isolation and deprivation of death row are not suffered by
the vast majority of prison inmates, they are unusual as well."). In an ongoing lawsuit,
prisoners on Virginia's death row claim that Virginia's policy of sending all prisoners
sentenced to death into solitary confinement on death row violates the Eighth Amendment.
See Complaint at 1-2, Porter v. Clarke, No. 1:14-CV-01588 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 2014).
Their case has come before District Judge Leonie Brinkema, the same judge who granted a
fellow death row prisoner's claim for due process relief in 2013 (only to be reversed
recently by the Fourth Circuit). Though the claim will be difficult to win because such
harsh treatment of death-row prisoners is not "unusual," as the Eighth Amendment
requires, Judge Brinkema has already expressed doubt in the 2013 case that Virginia prison
administrators have a sufficient penological purpose to justify automatically and
permanently sending all death-sentenced prisoners into solitary confinement on death row.
See Prieto v. Clarke, No. 1:12-CV- 1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12,
2013) (stating that the death row policy "further[ed] few, if any, legitimate penological
goals"), rev'don other grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). Scholars and death penalty
opponents also have cited the harsh conditions of death row to argue that the death penalty
itself is unconstitutionally cruel, contending that protracted isolation on death row followed
by execution exceeds the punishment permitted by the Constitution. See, e.g, Sun, supra
note 2.
To date, however, no court has held the Eighth Amendment to forbid the segregation
or isolation of prisoners on death row. Several federal courts have issued consent decrees to
remedy unusually extreme conditions of death row confinement caused by, for example,
severe lack of sanitation or extreme temperatures, but these orders have not barred the
isolation of death row prisoners or questioned the propriety of a separate death row. The
use of such decrees, moreover, is controversial. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
365 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (objecting that "the federal judiciary has for the last
half century been exercising 'equitable' powers and issuing structural decrees entirely out
of line with its constitutional mandate").
280 Other challenges to death row have been presented under the Due Process Clause.
A prisoner challenging confinement conditions under due process must show that he has a
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whether prison administrators have institutional authority to establish death
row in the first place. The Article now will address that question and will show
that at least in some states, the separation of powers forbids administrative
creation of death row. Additionally, the Ex Post Facto Clause may limit
legislatures' ability to rubber-stamp current administrative death row policies.
The role that courts may play enforcing these constitutional limits merits a
central place in death row scholarship and litigation.
1. SeparationofPowers As a Limit on Death Row

In most states, statutes do not require or even address the creation of death
row.2 82 Prison administrators have established death row based only on their
general authority to create custody conditions. In Virginia, for example, prison
administrators have cited two statutes to support their creation of death row.
One statute grants general authority to the Director of Corrections, 283 while the
other requires the Director to maintain a system of classification for evaluating
prisoners according to factors such as "background, aptitude, education, and
risk." 2 84 Neither of these statutes authorizes prison administrators to hold
death-sentenced prisoners in worse conditions based only on the crimes that
they committed.
In states like Virginia, where prison administrators have no express
authority to establish stricter conditions for death-sentenced prisoners, courts
should hold that the creation of death row by prison policy exceeds the
legitimate bounds of administrative authority. Unless a statute expressly
mandates death row, the law should not be read to allow prison administrators
the power to establish it. For any such prescription of additional punishment
ought to be express in order to satisfy the principle of legality and the rule of
lenity that helps enforce it. Moreover, though courts normally might defer to
liberty interest in avoiding those conditions. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221
(2005). The courts have not recognized a state-created or constitutionally created liberty
interest in avoiding death row. To the contrary, in the Virginia case mentioned above, the
Fourth Circuit has held that death-sentenced prisoners have no liberty interest in avoiding
solitary confinement on death row, where such death row confinement is prescribed by
"state law" or prison policy. See Prieto, 780 F.3d at 254. This decision will not be
overturned, because Virginia executed Alfred Prieto on October 1, 2015, rendering his
request for the Supreme Court's intervention moot. See Cristian Farias, Solitary
Confinement Case Dies with Death-Row Inmate's Execution, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/alfredo-prieto-solitary-confinement_
562227ece4b02f6a900c90 10 [https:/perma.cc/U3HJ-QSB5]; see also Prieto v. Clarke, 136
S. Ct. 319 (2015) (mem.) (dismissing petition for certiorari in Prieto v. Clarke as moot).
281 Finally, some courts have concluded that death row conditions violate international
law. See supra note 3 (citing decisions). Courts in the United States, however, have not
barred death row on international law grounds.
2 82
See supra Part III.C.
2 83
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-10 (2013).
2 84
Id § 53.1-32.1(A).
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an agency's interpretation of a statute governing its conduct, 28 5 a claim by
prison administrators that a statute silent regarding death row implicitly grants
authority for it would be an unreasonable reading of such a statute and would
not deserve deference. It would be unreasonable to claim that the legislature
intended by silence to delegate a quintessentially legislative function. 2 86
Moreover, if a state were to enact a statute authorizing prison
administrators to impose death row for punitive reasons, some state
constitutions would forbid such a delegation of power. The permissibility of
such delegation depends on state law and state courts have divided over
similar issues. For example, state courts have split over whether a legislature
may delegate to an agency the power to specify what controlled substances
come within the purview of a drug law. The Louisiana Supreme Court, among
other courts, has held such a statute invalid as an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority. 2 87 The court has explained: "[W]here a statute vests
arbitrary discretion in a board or an official without prescribing standards of
guidance there is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the
executive branch of the govermnent." 288 Other state courts have agreed. 289 On
the other hand, the Alabama Supreme Court has deemed such a statute
permissible, concluding that "it is the legislative will, not the [administrative
agency's], which states that, following a controlled classification, certain
conduct related to that controlled substance constitutes a public offense." 29 0 In
the case of a delegation of authority to impose death row, it seems likely that,
285 At least in the federal system, prison administrators usually would receive
deference for their interpretation of ambiguous statutes. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) ("[I]f the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."); Auth. to Advance
Funds to Cuban Detainees to Purchase Commissary Items, 12 Op. O.L.C. 64, 65 (1988)
("The deference that has been accorded the Bureau of Prisons in construing and applying
the statute which it administers is consistent with the general administrative law principles
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court." (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45)).
286 Even without invocation of the rule of lenity, the choice of prison administrators to
establish death row might be considered an unreasonable interpretation of their statutorily
granted authority to maintain prison security and order. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
2699, 2707 (2015) ("Chevron directs courts to accept an agency's reasonable resolution of
an ambiguity in a statute that the agency administers. Even under this deferential standard,
however, 'agencies must operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation."' (citation
omitted) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014))).
287 State v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d 1084, 1087 (La. 1980); see also id at 1085 ("Article
II, § I of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution divides the powers of government into three
separate branches: legislative, executive and judicial. Article II, § 2 provides that no one of
these branches may exercise power belonging to either of the others.").
288 Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d at 1086.
2 89
See Sundberg v. State, 216 S.E.2d 332, 333 (Ga. 1975); Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d
774, 779 (Miss. 1974); State v. Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D. 1970); State v.
Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977).
290
Ex parte McCurley, 390 So. 2d 25, 29 (Ala. 1980).
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at least in some states, such a delegation would be deemed constitutionally
impermissible.
If prison administrators claim the power to establish death row not for
punitive reasons, but based on security concerns, courts should reject and
refuse to grant deference to that reasoning. 29 1 To be sure, federal courts
usually defer to prison administrators' choices about how to manage prisons
and presume that administrators' choices are reasoned judgments based on
administrative expertise. 292 But prison administrators should not be presumed
to act reasonably and based on their institutional expertise when they place an
entire class of prisoners in solitary confinement based on their sentence
alone. 2 93 The automatic and permanent isolation of death-sentenced prisoners
on its face does not involve the use of expert judgment upon which
administrative deference is premised. Instead, it is a sentence-based and
presumptively punitive measure. 294 Courts should require concrete evidence
291 State and federal courts differ in their approaches to agency determinations. As a
general matter, several scholars have noted the need for more piercing review. Eric Berger,
for example, has argued that courts ought to consider more closely institutional behavior
before granting deference based on assumptions of institutional competence. See Eric
Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA
L. REV. 465, 470 (2013). Louis Virelli has argued for similarly stricter scrutiny in the
exercise of arbitrary-and-capricious or "hard look" review of administrative decisions in
the federal courts. See Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 92 N.C. L. REV. 721, 724-25 (2014) (arguing that the appropriate level of
deference should be determined by "a collection of more particularized inquiries into
specific components of agency decision making," such as "record building, reason giving,
input scope and quality, and rationality").
292See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977)
(recognizing the "wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of prison
administrators").
2 93
The district court in the Virginia death row case mentioned earlier in this Article
offers a model. In considering whether Virginia's death row policy imposed an atypical
and significant hardship on death-sentenced inmates that would implicate procedural due
process rights, the court asked whether the categorically harsh treatment of death-sentenced
inmates bore "a rational relationship to legitimate penological interests." Prieto v. Clarke,
No. 1:12-CV- 1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013), rev'd on other
grounds, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). Though the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground
that the district court should not have considered the hardship question because the
prisoner had failed to show, as a predicate matter, that death row infringed on any liberty
interest, the district court's analysis remains a useful guide should a liberty interest be
found in another case or by another court.
294 Whether a restriction is punitive or regulatory is not always obvious. The Supreme
Court has noted some features that can help draw the distinction:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment[,] whether it comes into play only on a

finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be

connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
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that such categorical treatment is needed for security purposes, before
accepting as an administrative necessity such a punitive provision. 295 In these
ways, courts may prevent prison administrators from illegitimately
augmenting the punishment for capital crimes.
2. Ex Post Facto Limitations on Death Row

If state courts invalidate administrative policies creating death row,
legislatures will be forced to enact legislation if they wish to preserve it.
Importantly, the Ex Post Facto Clause may bar legislatures from simply rubber
stamping under statutory law the death row practices that now occur based on
administrative policy. Specifically, the Ex Post Facto Clause may forbid
legislatures from requiring solitary confinement prior to execution for the
category of prisoners who have already committed their capital crimes. 29 6
The premise for this argument lies in an 1890 case in which the Supreme
Court invalidated on Ex Post Facto grounds a Colorado statute mandating
solitary confinement for all prisoners sentenced to death. 297 A prisoner had
challenged the statute on Ex Post Facto grounds, because he had committed
his capital crime before the statute went into effect. To determine whether the
Ex Post Facto Clause applied, the Court considered whether the law amplified
punishment. Rejecting the state's argument that the imposition of solitary
confinement was "a mere unimportant regulation as to the safe-keeping of the
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in
differing directions. Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal
nature of a statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its
face.

Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
29 5
Prisoners challenging death row would bear the initial burden of bringing evidence
to the attention of the courts that calls death row into doubt. Experts also might weigh in as
amici, as they did in the Prieto case. See supranote 126.
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit's decision reversing the district court, though not on
this point, may have perpetuated the idea that prison officials should receive unthinking
deference with regard to death row, even in the face of contrary evidence. See, e.g., Larry
O'Dell, Court OKs Automatic Solitary for Virginia Death-Row Inmates, CNS NEWS
(Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/articlecourt-oks-automatic-solitary-virginiadeath-row-inmates [https://perma.cc/6YEZ-AQ49] ("[T]he appeals court agreed with state
attorneys who argued that prison officials are better equipped than judges to assess security
risks and adopt appropriate safeguards.").
29 6
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall . . . pass any ... ex post facto
Law . . . ."). The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of penal statutes
that disadvantage the offender affected by them. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (5 DalI.) 386,
390-92 (1798); see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). Separate from this
limitation on the states, the Constitution protects against ex post facto laws by Congress.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.").
2971n re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1890). The statute also prohibited the warden
from warning the prisoner of which day had been chosen for his execution. Id. at 163-64.
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prisoner," the Court held that mandatory isolation constituted "an additional
punishment of the most important and painful character." 298 Furthermore, the
Court found that the isolation was not ameliorated by the fact that the prisoner
could have certain visitors, noting that administrative authorities could deny
such visits in their discretion. 299 The Court acknowledged a plausible
retributive and deterrent purpose in the mandatory isolation-noting that it
was designed "to mark [the condemned prisoners] as examples of the just
punishment of the worst crimes of the human race" 300-but held that such
punishment could not be imposed retroactively. 30 1 The Court's analysis thus
forbade a legislature from mandating as punishment what prison wardens were
already free to impose on individual prisoners. 3 02
The Supreme Court has never overruled that 1890 decision and it appears
to remain good law.30 3 Thus, if legislatures wished to retain death row after
invalidation of an administrative death row policy by a court, it is not clear
that they could simply revive the administrative policy of death row isolation.
If courts were to combine this understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause with
a strict understanding of the separation of powers, many of the 3,000 prisoners
now awaiting execution would have to be removed from death row, 304 and the
2981d at 167, 171.
299/d at 167-69.
300Id at 169-70; cf Coleman v. Balkeom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that "the deterrent value of incarceration during that period of
uncertainty may well be comparable to the consequences of the ultimate step itself").
301 In re Medley, 134 U.S. at 174.
302In two later decisions, the Supreme Court upheld statutes imposing solitary
confinement on death-sentenced inmates, making clear that the constitutional problem lay
in retroactive application of such harsh restrictions and not in the restrictions themselves.
See McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1891); Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S.
483, 493-96 (1890).
303 Recently, a court cited In re Medley in a case involving the transfer of a deathsentenced prisoner into solitary confinement. In re Gentry, 245 P.3d 766, 768 (Wash.
2010) (citing In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160). The court in that case found no ex post facto
violation because "solitary confinement was contemplated by state law at the time of [the
prisoner's] crime and sentence." Id. at 767. The court stated that to prevail on his ex post
facto claim, the inmate had to show that he had a liberty interest created by state law in
avoiding the harsh conditions of death row confinement; for this proposition the court
relied on its understanding of the due process principles set forth in Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472 (1995). See In re Gentry, 245 P.3d at 768 (citing In re Dyer, 143 Wash. 2d 384,
392-93 (2001) (citing Conner, 515 U.S. at 484)). Under this approach, the court concluded
that the inmate could not prevail, because state law granted prison authorities "broad
discretion over conditions of inmate housing" and the inmate had "no legitimate claim to
future entitlement or liberty interest in [less severe housing] conditions." Id at 769. The
court offered little justification for its layering of the limitations on due process claims and
ex post facto protections. Nor did the court explain how the mere "contemplation" of
solitary confinement under statutory law was sufficient to satisfy the principle of legality's
requirement of a clear and public prescription of punishment.
304
To be sure, not all courts may apply the Ex Post Facto Clause to limit legislatures
that wish to mandate harsh death row conditions. Some courts might conclude that the
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newly retained death row would have to remain empty until filled by the
newly convicted.
V. CONCLUSION

Many scholars have argued that death row conditions are senselessly cruel.
But most scholars and courts have accepted death row as an inevitable aspect
of capital punishment. Few scholars have addressed whether death row is
necessary and what purposes it might serve. As execution delays drag into
years and decades, the need for a reasoned and democratically legitimate
decision as to this significant de facto punishment becomes more pressing.
Additional punishment of prisoners condemned to die should not be imposed
unthinkingly. Justice Stevens has argued that the death penalty's continued
existence in America reflects "habit and inattention rather than an acceptable
deliberative process that weighs the costs and risks of administering that
penalty against its identifiable benefits." 30 5 Abolitionists and advocates of
capital punishment alike should agree that the death penalty and its
implementation-including the use of death row to augment punishmentshould not occur without a deliberate and democratically legitimate process
that gives voice to the relevant punitive, humanitarian, and fiscal concerns.
The question whether to retain death row does not need an empirical
answer from prison administrators about what security requires-for that
question has been answered by studies showing that categorically and
permanently sending all death-sentenced prisoners into segregation and
isolation is unnecessary. Instead, the question whether to retain death row
requires a normative answer about whether death row serves legitimate
punishment objectives or imposes too much undeserved suffering. That
normative answer must be provided by legislatures, not prison administrators.

prohibition on retroactive punishment is not violated by a legislative mandate that simply
confirms what has long been the existing administrative practice, despite In re Medley. But
a simple expectation of cruelty should not translate that treatment into a legitimate state
action; if that were the case, then legislators could decide to openly permit prison rape for
child molesters, too, as an expected and therefore retroactively valid part of punishment.
305
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).

